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"Every Day and in Every Way We Are All
Becoming Meta and Meta,"' or
How Communitarian Bargaining Theory
Conquered the World (of Bargaining Theory)
ROBERT J. CONDLIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Meta argument 2 goes beyond the frame of reference of another person to
a conversation to trump that person's views with those of a higher3 order.4 A
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Participants in a
Maryland Law School faculty workshop made many helpful comments on an earlier draft
and Susan McCarty completed the notes and put them in a coherent form. I am grateful to
all of them.
I This particular paraphrase of a well-known psychotherapeutic mantra is commonly
attributed to John Wisdom, a twentieth-century, British, ordinary-language philosopher
and philosopher of the mind. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a
Black Man, in COLOR CLASS IDENTITY: THE NEW POLITICS OF RACE 11, 11 (John Arthur
& Amy Shapiro eds., 1996); Paul Greenberg, How an Obscure Brown Department
Trained Graduates to Crack the Codes of American Culture--and Infiltrate the
Mainstream, BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 2004, at E2; Metatheatre,
http://instructl.cit.comell.edu/Courses/engl327/327.meta.html (last visited Aug. 26,
2007). The original, "Every day and in every way I am becoming better and better," was
the invention of Emile Cou6, a French pharmacist who developed a method of
psychotherapy based on auto-suggestion, or self-hypnosis, characterized by the frequent
repetition of the above statement. See EMILE COUt, SELF MASTERY THROUGH CONSCIOUS
AUTOSUGGESTION (Kessinger Publishing 1997) (1922). The argument for communitarian
bargaining has many of the same hypnotic properties as Coud's mantra and, also like the
mantra, has customers who swear that it works.
2 Meta argument is not to be confused with meta-analysis, a quantitative method in
social science for synthesizing entire bodies of research and identifying the variables that
might have affected the research's outcomes. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meta-Analysis:
A Primer for Legal Scholars, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 203-05 (2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-910962 (last visited Mar. 4, 2008); see also ROBERT
ROSENTHAL, META-ANALYTIC PROCEDURES FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH (rev. ed. 1991).
Meta-analysis is beginning to appear in legal bargaining scholarship. See Dan Orr &
Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New Insights from
Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597 (2006).
3 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 730 (10th ed. 1996) (meta -
"situated behind or beyond.., more highly organized.., more comprehensive[,]
transcending"); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (draft rev. Dec. 2001),
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speaker paraphrases the other person's position, usually in a slightly
caricatured form, and then rejects it as simplistic, beside the point, or
incomplete, judged from the speaker's more fully developed perspective. 5
He6 disposes of opposing contentions without responding to them directly, or
as they were expressed originally, shifting the ground on which the
conversation is based to take it off in a slightly-and sometimes greatly-
different direction. In the process, he tells the other person something new
about the nature of both that person's views and the subject about which they
make a claim, and implies that she should have thought about the subject
from this more complete perspective before she spoke. He says, tacitly, "I
understand this topic in more dimensions than you and because of that, you
should defer to me." Meta argument has special force in the academy because
academics do not like to be told that they have missed something. Not being
aware of all of the ideas necessarily in play in a conversation is deflating for
people who more frequently are enamored of conceptual sophistication than
practical consequences. When told they "don't get it," academics often clam
up, even when not certain the charge is warranted, to avoid being
intellectually embarrassed. This is a pyrrhic victory, of course, since in
academic discourse, silencing another is almost as noteworthy as convincing
him.
http://dictionary.oed.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2008) (meta- "beyond, above, at a higher
level").
4 See, e.g., STEVEN J. BRAMs & ALAN D. TAYLOR, THE WIN-WIN SOLUTION:
GUARANTEEING FAIR SHARES TO EVERYBODY, at ix (1999) [hereinafter BRAMS &
TAYLOR, WIN-WIN] ("Since the publication of... Getting to Yes... it has been widely
recognized that there is a.. . 'high ground'... between winning and losing in
negotiations.").
5 See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, ScoFr R. PEPPET, & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO,
BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 287 (2000)
("By naming the strategic problem created by... a question, you can sometimes dissuade
the other side from pursuing an answer to it. And you show that you understand the
strategic landscape and their motivation for asking. This can take the power out of such
inquiries.").
6 Readers should substitute opposite-gender pronouns throughout the article
wherever desired. I have randomized the pronoun selection process except where context
did not permit.
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The communitarian 7 challenge to the adversarial8 conception of legal
dispute bargaining, perhaps the most important development in the legal
bargaining literature in the last twenty-five years,9 is, in its basic nature and
in many of its specific manifestations, a form of meta argument. '0 It expands
the frame of reference against which conceptions of bargaining are to be
judged and shows how the adversarial conception falls short when measured
against this expanded frame of reference. 11 Ironically, however, meta
7 See Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining with a Hugger: The Weaknesses and Limits of a
Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining: or Why We Can't All Just Get
Along, 9 Cardozo J. Confl. Resol. 301 n.3 (2008) [hereinafter Condlin, Bargaining with a
Hugger] (describing communitarian bargaining); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering
Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 151 (2002) (describing frequently used synonyms for
"communitarian" bargaining, including: cooperative, problem-solving, integrative, value-
creating, soft, principled, and accommodating).
8 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 765-94 (1984) (describing
adversarial bargaining). Frequently used synonyms for "adversarial" bargaining include:
positional, competitive, zero-sum, hard, and distributive. DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL
NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 14-15 (1989) ("no consistent nomenclature of
negotiation strategies exists in either the legal or social scientific literature"-using
"competitive," and "distributive"); Menkel-Meadow, supra, at 764-66 (using
"adversarial," "zero-sum," and "distributive"); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETIING
To YES 3-8 (1981) (using "positional" and "hard"). I prefer "adversarial" because the
term has a longer history in legal scholarship and a more familiar meaning. It also
describes the nature of the bargaining style communitarians object to more accurately and
evocatively. "Positional" is probably the most popular alternative, but it is particularly
inapt. It is not possible to converse at all without taking positions. Even the statement of
an interest is simultaneously the statement of a "position"-i.e., "my position is that it is
in my interest to _ " It is probably not position-taking that communitarians
object to, but the unreasonable refusal to reconsider and revise a position under any
circumstances, and the term adversarial seems to capture this idea better.
9 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why Hasn't the World Gotten to Yes? An
Appreciation and Some Reflections, 22 NEGOT. J. 485, 485-87 (2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=943009 (last visited Mar. 4, 2008) (describing how
communitarian bargaining theory has "revolutionized how negotiation is taught in law
schools").
10 BRAMS & TAYLOR, WIN-WIN, supra note 4, at ix (describing communitarian
theory as representing the "high ground" in the debate over competing conceptions of
negotiation).
I I Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving
and Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 97-98 (2001) ("I began
talking about legal problem solving in the 1970s, while attempting to reframe the way
lawyers approached legal negotiations, suggesting that a different mind-set, orientation or
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argument itself can be an adversarial bargaining technique and in using it,
communitarians run the risk of adopting an approach they profess to reject,
emulating their adversarial counterparts more than providing an alternative to
them. 12 Communitarians also believe in openness, candor, respect, and a
communal perspective toward settlement, and are against deception,
dishonesty, belligerence, and exclusively self-interested thinking. 13 Yet,
many communitarian criticisms of adversarial bargaining are themselves
surprisingly combative, exclusivist, and manipulative, both in tone and
content, and they exploit ignorance and insecurity as often as they identify
and correct analytical error. All too frequently, these arguments look like
self-interested strategies for competing successfully for academic stature and
influence more than collaborative overtures to colleagues to work out
problems of bargaining theory together. Surprisingly, communitarians often
seem more interested in ruling the world of bargaining theory than in
improving it.
This communitarian use of adversarial methods, self-consciously or
otherwise, is a strange phenomenon, a sort of behavioral violation of the
principle of non-contradiction, and its prominence in the bargaining literature
should give one pause in judging the merits of the communitarian argument.
Action is often a better indicator than talk of what a person truly believes, so
framework, which I called problem-solving, would produce both better outcomes and
processes than the more conventional, adversarial approach to legal negotiations.")
(footnote omitted).
12 1 do not mean to say that meta argument inevitably must be adversarial-one
could expand the frame of reference of a conversation in a supportive and collegial
manner-but just that communitarians have used their expanded conception of effective
bargaining to criticize and supplant adversarial bargaining rather than supplement and
refine it. Ordinarily, communitarians would view this kind of win-lose approach to
conversation as characteristic of the adversarial method. I give examples of this criticism
throughout the discussion.
13 Barbara Gray, Negotiating With Your Nemesis, 19 NEGOT. J. 299, 299-310 (2003)
(describing the process of openly expressing emotion to an adverse negotiator); Michael
W. Morris & Dacher Keltner, How Emotions Work: The Social Functions of Emotional
Expression in Negotiations, 22 RESEARCH IN ORG. BEHAVIOR 1, 1-50 (2000) (describing
rapport-building communication methods of problem-solving negotiation); Donald G.
Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST.
L.J. 41, 52-57 (1985) (describing how cooperative bargainers seek to reach solutions
which are "fair and equitable to both parties and seek to build an interpersonal
relationship based on trust"); Schneider, supra note 7, at 164-65 (describing problem-
solving negotiators as "courteous, friendly, tactful, cooperative.., honest, forthright,
trustful, sincere... [and not someone who would] make unfair representations, use
haranguing or offensive tactics, make threats, or advance unwarranted claims").
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that when someone says one thing and does another, one takes him literally
at one's peril. Besides, if adversarial methods are needed to demonstrate the
ineffectiveness of adversarial methods, there is some question whether the
point has truly been made. In a sense, the scholarly debate over the relative
merits of communitarian and adversarial conceptions of legal bargaining is a
negotiation of sorts, in which each side advances arguments and makes
proposals in response to equivalent moves by the other. From this
perspective, communitarians often bargain more adversarially than their
allegedly 14 adversarial counterparts and this makes their argument a form of
"do what I say, not what I do" advice, when "what I say" is ideologically and
aesthetically derived.
I discuss the foregoing claims in the following manner. In the first part of
Section II, I describe the communitarian critique of adversarial bargaining-
that it is gratuitously belligerent, polarizes relationships, wastes resources,
retards social development, and prevents agreements that might otherwise be
reached -and show how the manner in which this critique is expressed often
exemplifies the very behaviors it seeks to criticize. I take the communitarian
critique from articles reproduced in the principal texts used to teach
bargaining in American law schools. 15 These articles, all the work of highly
regarded scholars, present the best case for communitarian methods and,
because of their prominence, are likely to have the greatest influence on law
students' and lawyers' understanding of legal bargaining.
In the second part of Section II, I describe the other side of the coin, the
normative and empirical case for communitarian bargaining. I show how
these arguments, perhaps even more so than their critical counterparts,
employ sophisticated reworkings of familiar rhetorical strategies to make the
communitarian case. It is as if, unknowingly, communitarians set out to
refine adversarial methods rather than replace them, to develop more
effective strategies for competing successfully in an adversarial world rather
14 1 hope to show that the communitarian description of adversarial bargaining is
often overdrawn and that many of the objections to its methods lack real support.
15 See generally CHARLES B. WIGGINS & L. RANDOLPH LOWRY, NEGOTIATION AND
SETTLEMENT ADVOCACY: A BOOK OF READINGS (2d ed. 2005); ALAN ScoTr RAU,
EDWARD F. SHERMAN, & Scorr R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE
ROLE OF LAWYERS (3d ed. 2002); CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION
AND SETTLEMENT (5th ed. 2005); CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, ANDREA KUPFER
SCHNEIDER, & LELA PORTER LOVE, NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING
(2006); JAY FOLBERG & DWIGHT GOLANN, LAWYER NEGOTIATION: THEORY, PRACTICE,
AND LAW (2006); THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE
EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds.,
2006) [hereinafter NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK].
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than reconstruct that world along communitarian lines. In a sense, they
identified the enemy and it was they. 16
II. Is COMMUNITARIAN BARGAINING THEORY TRULY
COMMUNITARIAN?
By its own account, communitarian bargaining is nothing if not
communal. 17 From its conception of the nature of legal disputing to its
definition of proper and effective bargaining technique, it looks at bargaining
from the perspective of what is good for the social group rather than the
single individual, and from the time frame of a lifetime in bargaining rather
than a single encounter.1 8 In a communitarian world the only good settlement
is a lasting one, and for any single member of a group to be satisfied, all must
be satisfied. As a consequence, communitarian theory gives the highest
priority to working in unison with others, creating hybrid strategies for
solving common problems, and pursuing shared objectives.' 9 In theory, it
combines, incorporates, shares, and joins rather than divides, destroys,
conceals, and controls.20 It builds bridges rather than barriers. 21 It is against
16 Apologies to Walt Kelly. See WALT KELLY, WE HAvE MET THE ENEMY AND HE
Is Us (1972). For the history of the expression, see Marilyn White, I Go Pogo,
http://www.igopogo.com/wehave_met.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
17 For a summary of the most important properties of communitarian bargaining, see
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 491 ("Among the most important contributions of
[communitarian theory] was the focus on 'joint' or mutual, rather than individual, gain.").
For a grandiose paraphrase, see id. at 492 (communitarian theory "turned negotiation into
a deontological Kantian project of treating all people as ends, not means, for mutual
benefit, not self-interested Hobbesian coexistence.").
18 See Gifford, supra note 13, at 50-54; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 802 (the
communitarian negotiator "consider[s] how the [parties'] needs may change over the long
run"').
19 John S. Murray, Understanding Competing Theories of Negotiation, 2 NEGOT. J.
179, 182-85 (1986) (describing how the problem-solving negotiator "[c]onsiders
needs/interests/attitudes of other side as both relevant and legitimate to resolving the
dispute"); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 795 ("the problem-solving model presents
opportunities for discovering greater numbers of and better quality solutions... [for]
meeting a greater variety of [the parties'] needs both directly and by trading off different
needs, rather than forcing a zero-sum battle over a single item.").
20 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 795-96 (describing examples of such
behavior).
21 Dean G. Pruitt, Achieving Integrative Agreements, in NEGOTIATING IN
ORGANIATIONS 35, 40-41 (Max H. Bazerman & Roy J. Lewicki eds., 1983) (describing
integrative strategy of "Bridging").
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competition, secrecy, deception, and manipulation and in favor of openness,
candor, generosity, respect, and kindness. 22 It is the opposite of the
adversarial or positional bargaining that dominates modem American legal
practice, or at least it says it is. 23
Let us suppose for a moment that all of this is true. It would then seem
fair to expect a bargaining theory of this sort to follow the same principles in
all aspects of its existence, including the manner in which it engages other
bargaining theories in an attempt to explain the nature of bargaining. If
working jointly with others is the best way to settle legal disputes, then
presumably it also is the best way to settle disagreements over bargaining
theory. One would expect communitarian theory to reach out to adversarial
theory, therefore, seeking to add to and build upon the best parts of the latter
rather than to dismiss it out of hand. One would expect it to respect a
conception of bargaining that had remained influential over several decades
of bargaining practice and assume that such a view must have something to
contribute to a unified theory of bargaining. One would expect it to see
adversarial theory as a partner in the process of understanding and explaining
bargaining generally, rather than as a competitor in a struggle for control of
the bargaining theory universe. One would expect it to approach the
scholarly enterprise in a collegial frame of mind, in other words, planning to
supplement and refine prevailing views rather than replace them, to be one
more piece in the bargaining puzzle rather than the final word.24
22 Don A. Moore, Myopic Prediction, Self-Destructive Secrecy, and the Unexpected
Benefits of Revealing Final Deadlines in Negotiation, 94 ORG. BEH. & HUMAN DEC.
PRoC. 125-39 (2004) (describing the importance of negotiators revealing full and
accurate information about costs, deadlines, and situational pressures); Clark Freshman,
Adele Hayes, & Greg Feldman, The Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist: What We
Know and Don't Know About How Mood Relates to Successful Negotiation, 2002 J. DISP.
REsOL. 1-79 (describing optimal negotiator "moods"); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at
822 ("The problem solver recognizes that he is more likely to develop solutions which
meet the parties' needs by revealing his own needs or objectives.").
23 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 104-06 (describing the differences between
communitarian and adversarial bargaining).
24 1 do not suggest that it is necessarily unprincipled or contradictory for
communitarians to fail to find good in everything. When views are indisputably wrong,
presumably communitarians, just like anyone else, are free to reject them out of hand.
Moreover, if the views also are dangerous, communitarians should be free to use the full
complement of rhetorical techniques, communitarian and otherwise, to suppress them.
My point is simply that communitarian theory's confrontation with adversarial bargaining
did not and does not present such a situation. Adversarial methods have much to
contribute to a unified theory of bargaining as even the sub rosa communitarian adoption
of such methods described in this article shows.
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It seems fair to ask, therefore, whether communitarian bargaining theory
meets these expectations. Does it blend with adversarial bargaining, for
example, to create a new hybrid alternative that is stronger than
communitarian or adversarial theory standing alone? Or instead, does it
challenge adversarial theory to a kind of Wild West shootout, a winner-take-
all contest in which the ultimate prize is exclusive control over the world of
bargaining theory? Sadly, if the attitude manifested by proponents of
communitarian theory in the scholarly literature is the best evidence, the
answer is all too clear. Communitarian theory has opted to be the new fast
gun in town, to knock off its long-established adversarial counterpart and
reconfigure the world of bargaining theory in communitarian terms.25 This
attitude is evident in two distinct parts of the communitarian literature. The
first is its critique of adversarial bargaining and the caricatured and
ungenerous description of the adversarial approach on which that critique is
based. The second is its statement of the normative and empirical case for
communitarian bargaining and the misleading, disingenuous, and
manipulative use it makes of data to support that case. I will provide
examples of each.
A. The (Non) Communitarian Indictment of Adversarial Bargaining
The communitarian indictment of adversarial bargaining is all-
encompassing, rejecting the adversarial method in all of its manifestations,
along with adversarial bargaining's foundational commitment to the pursuit
of individual self-interest.26 Communitarian theory is a total and exclusivist
view. It treats the distilled lessons of decades of adversarial bargaining
practice as misguided, an evolutionary frolic and detour, and speaks as if
communitarian theory presents the first true description of effective legal
bargaining. The earliest, most highly regarded, and enthusiastic statement of
this particular view is Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow's important mid-
1980s article, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
25 Professor Menkel-Meadow may acknowledge this indirectly even though she
does not consciously ratify it as a goal. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 495 ("I
sometimes wonder if [communitarian scholarship illustrating cognitive distortions in
bargaining] gets in the way of using the simpler, if more positive, principles of 'principled
negotiation."') (footnote omitted).
26 Communitarian commentators do not say explicitly that there is nothing good
about adversarial bargaining, they simply criticize all aspects of it and fail to include any
of its features in the communitarian alternative.
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Problem Solving.27 Professor Menkel-Meadow's article was both the first
systematic statement of the problem solving version of communitarian
bargaining and also the first comprehensive indictment of the adversarial
alternative. 28 To this day it remains the article upon which most subsequent
criticism of adversarial bargaining is grounded. It is the Bible of
communitarian bargaining and its Ninety-Five Theses as well.
29
Professor Menkel-Meadow reduced all types of adversarial bargaining to
a single "unidimensional conception" 30 characterized by parties who "want[]
as much as [they] can get,"3 1 and who "focus[] on 'maximizing victory."' 32
These characteristics describe both the way adversarial bargainers think
bargaining should proceed and dictate the types of behaviors they should
27 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8. Menkel-Meadow's latest discussion of bargaining
illustrates the extent to which communitarians have learned to express their inhospitality
to adversarial methods in a more indirect manner. Now, rather than attack adversarial
bargaining directly, Menkel-Meadow simply leaves it out of her description of the
bargaining universe. For example, in summarizing the twenty-five year old debate
between proponents of adversarial and communitarian methods she neglects to mention
the work of many of the most important proponents of adversarial methods--Gary
Bellow, Bea Moulton, Charles Craver, Harry Edwards, Donald Gifford, Dwight Golann,
Gary Lowenthal, Cornelius Peck, Scott Peppett, Edward Sherman, and many others. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, passim. James White gets mentioned, of course, this time
as someone who sees "the world as dark, competitive, and brutish." Id. at 491 (footnote
omitted). Professor White is a favorite whipping boy of communitarian commentators,
perhaps because he grounds his views in actual bargaining practice rather than idealized
models. See Condlin, Bargaining With a Hugger, supra note 7, at 5 n.13.
28 The widely-read first edition of Getting to Yes by Roger Fisher and William Ury
predates Professor Menkel-Meadow's work by a few years but Fisher and Ury
incorporated aspects of adversarial bargaining into their theory of principled bargaining;
unlike Menkel-Meadow, they did not reject it completely. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM
URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed.,
1981). For a discussion of the differences between principled and problem-solving
bargaining, see Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence
of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 39-41 (1992) [hereinafter
Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark].
29 Professor Menkel-Meadow may have qualified her views over the years,
acknowledging now that legal dispute bargaining is different from generic problem
solving. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 102-03 (describing the distinctive
features of legal dispute bargaining).
30 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 767.
31 Id. at 765.
32 Id. at 764. I take it this means "maximizing the likelihood of being victorious."
Menkel-Meadow explains that "'[m]aximizing victory' involves two separate goals.., to
'maximize the likelihood the client will prevail,' and ... to maximize the amount the
client receives upon prevailing." Id. at 764 n.33 (citation omitted).
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use.33 Adversarial bargaining, in Professor Menkel-Meadow's view, is a
"stylized linear ritual of struggle," made up of "high first offers, leading to a
compromise point along a linear field of pre-established 'commitment and
resistance' points," 34 often resulting in a "split the difference" resolution. 35 It
proceeds by demand, threat, and bluff, and eschews reasoned analysis of
substantive differences based on consensus background norms. 36 Adversarial
bargainers outlast, intimidate, and deceive foes into making ill-advised
concessions and agreements, rather than teach others something new about
the issues in dispute.37 Recast in terms of a popular communitarian metaphor,
adversarial bargaining is a kind of pie-throwing contest in which each side
throws and ducks in reverberating sequence until one or the other concedes,
with the cleanest--or dirtiest, depending upon one's perspective-bargainer
winning.38 It is all form and no substance, 39 a kind of alpha male head-
33 Id. at 767.
34 Id.
35 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 770. "Linearity" is a recurring adjective in
Menkel-Meadow's criticism of adversarial bargaining, though it is not exactly clear what
she means by it. Perhaps she means to say that negotiation is a form of stylized dance to a
middle, with both sides making concessions that converge symmetrically, though it
would seem possible to do this in many patterns other than a straight line.
36 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 769 (describing adversarial bargaining as a
"ritual of offer and demand"); id. at 778-80 (describing the techniques of adversarial
bargaining as including bullying, manipulating, deceiving, overpowering, and taking
advantage of the other side); Schneider, supra note 7, at 163 ("The adversarial negotiator
is inflexible (stubborn, assertive, demanding, firm, tough, forceful) and self-centered
(headstrong, arrogant, egotistical). This negotiator likes to fight (irritating, argumentative,
quarrelsome, hostile) and the method of fighting is suspect (suspicious, manipulative,
evasive).").
37 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 778 ("Adversarial negotiation processes are
frequently characterized by arguments and statements rather than questions and searches
for new information... [and by] competitive strategies designed to force the other side to
capitulate.") (footnote omitted).
38 Murray, supra note 19, at 182 (describing how the competitive negotiator
"[c]hooses processes and strategies similar to military maneuvers [and] focus[es] on the
process of winning, not on the resolution of disputes"); Leonard Greenhalgh, The Case
Against Winning in Negotiations, 3 NEGOT. J. 167, 167-73 (1987) (criticizing the
prevalence of win-lose approaches to negotiation).
39 Interestingly, the problem-solving conception of bargaining Professor Menkel-
Meadow would substitute for adversarial bargaining is a process-rather than ends-
based conception as well. It just emphasizes different processes. See Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of Legal Processes, 94
GEO. L. J. 553, 554 (2006) (describing the priority of "process pluralism" over
"substantive commitments" in dispute settlement). Menkel-Meadow's substantive
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butting, the product of vestigial, atavistic impulses lingering in the gene pool
from a more primitive developmental period.40
Menkel-Meadow found acceptance of this approach to be "remarkably
uniform" in the legal bargaining literature,41 and argued that while it might
work in disputes over single issues, it is "clearly insufficient when the issues
in a negotiation are many and varied."42 This description is overdrawn, of
course, perhaps to sharpen the contrast between adversarial bargaining and
Professor Menkel-Meadow's problem solving alternative. Whatever the
motive, Professor Menkel-Meadow's vision of adversarial bargaining is a
straw man, and not a picture of real life bargaining. When her description is
compared to more sophisticated depictions of actual bargaining,43 it becomes
clear that her true bogeyman is incompetent bargaining, not adversarial
bargaining. To support the claim that her description is representative, she
cites to a somewhat infamous Clearinghouse Review article on hardball
negotiation tactics for legal services lawyers and an insouciant book on
bargaining tips for Playboy readers.44 Neither of these was an attempt to
commitments are to "fairness, equality, reduction of human pain and suffering, care for
all human beings, tolerance, peaceful coexistence wherever possible, and justice." Id at
554 n.5. This list captures the diffusiveness of the communitarian position perfectly. It
reminds one of the architect who had ten ideas and put them all in the same house.
Menkel-Meadow also uses the architect metaphor to describe her lecture, but she gives it
a different spin. See id. at 554-55.
40 The idea that adversarial bargainers are insufficiently socialized brutes continues
to appear in the communitarian literature. See, e.g., Editors' Note, Catherine H. Tinsley,
Jack J. Cambria, & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Reputations in Negotiation, in THE
NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK, supra note 11, at 203 (describing adversarial bargainers as
having "a Formica plaque... [on their] desk[s that says] 'Yea, when I walk through the
Valley of the Shadow of Death I shall fear no evil, for I am the meanest son of a bitch in
the valley."').
41 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 768.
42 Id. at 771 (footnote omitted).
43 Cf Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (describing settlement negotiations
in Silicon Valley securities litigation).
44 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 776 n.88 (citing MICHAEL MELTSNER &
PHILIP G. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION 231-40 (1974); and HERB COHEN, You CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING (1980)).
The Meltsner and Schrag book excerpt was adapted from Michael Meltsner & Philip G.
Schrag, Negotiating Tactics for Legal Services Lawyers, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 259
(1973). The Cohen book was first serialized in Playboy Magazine. The Cohen book was
more clever than mean-spirited, and the Meltsner and Schrag piece was more a defensive
reaction to the use of hardball tactics against legal services clients than a suggestion to
legal services lawyers that they engage in pre-emptive adversarial strikes. Professors
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describe a complete theory of ordinary bargaining practice, and each
qualified and restricted its recommendations in numerous, situation-specific
ways.45 In fact, if caricatured adversarial maneuvering of the sort Professor
Menkel-Meadow describes as typical dominates ordinary bargaining
practice, one wonders how so many lawyers could have been induced to buy
into the system. It is not in their interest and does not play to their
strengths.46 Perhaps Professor Menkel-Meadow's criticisms were just the
exuberance of youth. She expressed them over twenty years ago and many of
us were more combative then. 47 While she has re-affirmed some of the
criticisms over the years, she also has softened them somewhat and now
seems willing to make room for bargaining maneuvers and techniques she
once thought inappropriate. 48
Not everyone has mellowed, of course; many express the original
indictment of adversarial bargaining with all the same gusto as Professor
Menkel-Meadow in her early years-sometimes even more so-and the
trashing of adversarial bargaining remains one of the core moves of
Meltsner and Schrag are a particularly unlikely pair to make representatives of the
adversarial case. They have devoted their entire practice and academic lives to serving
the poor and underrepresented and perhaps because of this, unlike the wave of
communitarian commentators, they take practical concerns into account in constructing a
bargaining theory.
45 Meltsner & Schrag, Negotiating Tactics, supra note 44, at 259 ("This list of
tactics is not intended to endorse the propriety of every one of them."); id. at 260
(qualifying the tactic of outnumbering the other side in situations where it would make
the person feel insecure); COHEN, supra note 44, at 149-58 (recommending that parties
negotiate "for mutual satisfaction" and "harmonize" and "reconcile" needs); id. at 119-48
(describing "[w]inning at all costs" as a "Soviet Style"); id. at 163-205 (describing the
"win-win" technique).
46 To work, the style requires an intimidating presence, a bullying personality, a
willingness to make demands without giving reasons, the capacity to lie to another face-
to-face, and the like. Lawyers often are depicted in popular culture as bullies, blusterers,
liars, and the like, but anyone who has ever taught in law school realizes that, on the
whole, lawyers are remarkably ordinary, with all of the mannerisms, values, foibles,
anxieties, and limitations of people generally. Some are bullies, liars, and boors to be
sure, but that also is true of the population at large.
47 See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling": The Law School Clinic
and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (1986) (a tendentious criticism of the tacit
authoritarian culture and ideology of clinical legal education).
48 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39, at 555-56 (accepting the role of principled
argument, preference trading, and passionate commitment in human problem solving); id.
at 565 n.54 (acknowledging that "[c]onflicts [can be] necessary for justice").
242
[Vol. 23:2 20081
HOW COMMUNITARIAN BARGAINING CONQUERED THE WORLD
Alternative Dispute Resolution scholarship. 49 For example, John Murray
describes the adversarial approach to bargaining as representing a refusal to
bargain, a process of presenting "an unbreachable defensive position" which
an "opponent cannot dislodge or defeat.., by any means of persuasion based
on the merits."50 Adversarial bargainers "coerc[e]," "deceiv[e]," and
"manipulat[e]" opponents, 5 1 choose strategies based on what will yield the
biggest gain no matter the cost, ignore concerns of "fairness, wisdom,
durability, and efficiency," 52 and consider the "needs/interests/attitudes of
opponent[s] as not legitimate .... "53 "Like a military general," 54 they get
excited about the prospect of achieving "victory over the opponent on the
field of battle,"55 and leave the task of "[r]esolving the underlying
disagreements between [the] parties... to others ... [so that they can] savor
the... challenge of the negotiation chase as if it were only a game, like
baseball, chess, or poker." 56
Even respectful and temperate commentators sometimes join in the
assault. For example, Professors Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello (MP&T)
criticize adversarial bargaining for its hubris. In assuming they can get better
than average results, say MP&T, adversarial bargainers necessarily must
think they are more "skill[ful], intelligent, [and] sophisticated" than other
bargainers, and that for them bargaining is just a game of "fishing for
suckers." 57 The mistake here, of course, is the failure to recognize that
49 Even Professor Menkel-Meadow sometimes cannot resist the urge. In her recent
Chettel lecture, where she makes inclusivist overtures to adversarial bargaining, she also
caricatures the adversary approach one more time, perhaps for old time's sake. See, e.g.,
id at 573 (describing how communitarian "processes are intended to enhance public
participation, create more enlightened citizens, and produce higher quality and more
variegated, creative, and tailored solutions to modem complex problems than
conventional on/off decisions produced by the conventional adversary system of trial, or
unprincipled compromise in its shadow.") (emphasis added).
50 Murray, supra note 19, at 183.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 182.
54 Id. at 183. It's not clear why Murray excludes Naval Officers from his metaphor.
55 Id.
56 Murray, supra note 19, at 183. Murray has chosen an odd assortment of games to
illustrate his "thrill of victory" point. Lulling one to sleep, rather than beating him into
submission, comes more immediately to mind when one thinks of baseball and chess, and
none of the games listed is associated with the kind of trash-talking animosities
commonplace in football, soccer, boxing, and other more physical sports.
57 MNOOKIN, PEPPET, & TULUMELLO, supra note 5, at 321-22 ("[A] competitive
hard bargainer will achieve a better result for a client than a problem solver-if the other
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bargaining is a learning experience as much as a contest.58 Not all bargainers
start with a complete understanding of the issues in controversy, 59 or access
to all of the relevant data. Not all bargainer arguments are dispositive, and
not all party interests are clearly defined and rigidly held. As a consequence,
even highly skilled bargainers change their minds about what cases are
worth.60 It is reasonable, therefore, for bargainers to assume that they will be
able to teach one another something during the course of a bargaining
conversation. 61 In fact, this is a commonplace assumption in all serious
conversation about differences. Take MP&T's "conversation" with their
readers about the nature of effective bargaining. In accusing adversarial
bargainers of hubris, MP&T necessarily must assume that they might be able
to convince others to see things their way. If so, why isn't the same
explanation available to adversarial bargainers defending their expectations
of better-than-average results? Helping others learn is a social act, not an
arrogant one, based on trust in the others' ability to understand and grow
side is represented by ineffective counsel so eager to settle the dispute or make a deal that
he simply offers concession after concession. [P]roblem-solving ... probably gives up
some opportunities to fish for suckers [but] how you see this cost.., will depend on how
likely you believe it is that those you negotiate against will be less skilled, intelligent, or
sophisticated than you are."). Other commentators agree that any attempt to bargain
adversarially must be based on "the assumption that the other side can be bullied,
manipulated or deceived." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 778; see also Murray, supra
note 19, at 184-85 ("The success of [adversarial bargaining] depends largely on an
inequality in the relative level of negotiator competence, which is not a solid base for
generating consistently good outcomes.").
5 8 See P. H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE 82 (1979) (describing negotiation as a "cyclical process comprising the
repetitive exchange of information between the parties, its assessment, and the resulting
adjustments of expectations and preferences"); William P. Bottom & Paul W. Paese,
Judgment Accuracy and the Asymmetric Cost of Errors in Distributive Bargaining, 8
GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 349, 357 (1999) (describing how bargaining leads to an
understanding of the other side's constraints).
59 As Steve Goodman sang, "a mind confused is sometimes altered." STEVE
GOODMAN, Roving Cowboy, on WORDS WE CAN DANCE To (Red Pajama Records 1976).
60 Skillful bargainers concede for other reasons as well. A client may lack adequate
resources to prosecute the case, have a low tolerance for risk, or see better opportunities
for gain elsewhere and, as a consequence, instruct the lawyer to settle the case on the
adversary's terms.
61 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39, at 574 n.87 (describing research experiments
showing that "people actually do change their minds and educate each other" in
deliberative discussions).
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from new information and experiences, and this is as true for adversarial
bargainers as it is for MP&T.62
B. The Normative Case for Communitarian Bargaining
The normative case for communitarian bargaining has many of the same
adversarial properties as the communitarian critique. Rather than argue
directly for the efficacy of communitarian methods based on evidence from
actual bargaining practice, communitarians more often turn to anecdote,
parable, and personal taste to support their claims.63 When they provide
empirical evidence it usually takes the form of responses to opinion surveys
describing perceptions of bargaining, rather than direct data about bargaining
itself.64 There are many variations on this argument strategy and I will
describe a few of the most common ones below.
1. Jack Sprat Hypotheticals
The first attempts to justify communitarian bargaining were based on the
assumption that it was possible to satisfy the interests of all parties to a
bargaining dispute equally, that bargaining was a positive and not a zero-sum
game in which party interests inevitably complemented one another.65 If
bargainers are sufficiently imaginative and clever, communitarians believe,
brainstorming together honestly and candidly, they will discover mutually
62 "Your friends will tell you that they are sincere; your enemies are really so. Let
your enemies' censure be like a bitter medicine, to be used as a means of self-
knowledge." Arthur Schopenhauer, Counsels and Maxims, in THE PESSIMIST'S
HANDBOOK: A COLLECTION OF POPULAR ESSAYS 738 (T. Baily Saunders trans., The
University of Nebraska Press 1976) (1851).
63 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39, at 559 (describing how the experience
of non-adjudicatory decisionmaking during a Legal Process course in law school was
"mesmeriz[ing]" in a way that the "first-year, standard, Professor Kingsfield - One L
experience" was not) (footnote omitted).
64 Sometimes they simply report on personal experiences and ask the reader
(implicitly) to take their word both for what happened, and how it should be interpreted.
See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39, at 560 ("In the back of my legal services office
was one woman lawyer, who, instead of bringing dramatic class action lawsuits, quietly
cultivated relationships and negotiated good outcomes for her clients.").
65 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 784-93 (describing the zero-sum assumptions
of the adversarial model of bargaining); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 104-06
(describing the various ways in which the communal conception of bargaining objectives
have been described in the literature over the years).
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satisfactory solutions.66 To support this claim, communitarians offer a series
of what might be described as "paired in the voting" nursery-rhyme-like
stories in which participant objectives dovetail rather than conflict. Dividing
an orange between two people, for example, is accomplished by giving one
person pulp and the other peel;67 a piece of cake is shared by giving one
person icing and the other cake;68 and a couple who individually prefer
mountains and ocean are encouraged to vacation at a mountain resort next to
the seashore.69 These examples seem quaint in retrospect, notwithstanding
that an occasional commentator still uses them, but at the time of the
communitarian ascendance they were offered in all seriousness as proof of
the advantages of communitarian bargaining. 70 Even then it seemed a little
66 Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Creativity and Problem-Solving, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 697,
698-99 (2004) (describing the process and benefits of "brainstorming"); Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 11, at 105-12 (describing the role of working creatively with
another negotiator in problem solving negotiation); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at
818-22 (describing the process of "exploring and considering both parties' underlying
needs and objectives" as part of a "two-sided brainstorming [session] with the other
party").
67 This might have worked had Samuel Johnson been involved in the negotiation.
Apparently Dr. Johnson preferred peel to pulp, but for reasons that remain mysterious.
Frank Kermode, Lives of Dr. Johnson, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 22, 2006, at 28, 30
(describing how Johnson "collected bits of orange peel from the oranges he had
presumably squeezed [and] scraped and preserved the dried fragments [but] refused to
tell the inquisitive Boswell why he did so, thus frustrating the biographer's legitimate
passion for little 'specimens ... of Johnson's character."').
68 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 771. For more on cake, see infra notes 93 and
147-52 and accompanying text.
69 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 799. Dean Pruitt suggests that if the couple is
fortunate enough to have four weeks of vacation they could divide it evenly, spending
two weeks in the mountains and another two weeks at the seashore. Dean G. Pruitt,
Achieving Integrative Agreements, in NEGOTIATING IN ORGANIZATIONS 35, 37 (Max H.
Bazerman & Roy J. Lewicki eds., 1983). Menkel-Meadow finds this resolution
unsatisfying because of the transaction costs involved in moving from place to place and
the fact that it will leave each party unhappy half of the time. Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 8, at 799. "Everybody happy all of the time" seems to be a credo of communitarian
bargaining. It reminds one of Lewis Carroll's dodo. LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED
ALICE: ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 49
(1960) ("Everybody has won, and all must have prizes.").
70 Legal scholars use the orange and cake illustrations with great facility but it takes
a skilled social scientist to get both into the same data set. See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman,
Negotiator Judgment: A Critical Look at the Rationality Assumption, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI.
211, 215-16 (1983) (describing "two sisters [who] agreed to split [an] orange in half,
allowing one sister to use her portion for juice and the other sister to use the peel of her
half for a cake," overlooking "the integrative agreement of giving one sister all the juice
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ironic that communitarians would treat nursery rhymes as empirical
evidence, particularly given their critique of adversarial bargaining as lacking
a firm empirical grounding,71 but communitarian argument is nothing if not
inconsistent and it has a difficult time separating personal taste from
empirical fact.72
In addition to being self-serving, nursery rhymes do a poor job of
modeling the world of actual bargaining practice. Every now and then, I
suppose, one is called upon to help members of the Sprat 73 family settle a
dispute. Here, preferences complement rather than compete with one another.
But for the most part, people raised in a common culture share tastes rather
than divide them, and have similar hopes and expectations for bargaining
outcomes rather than opposite ones.74 Disputes of any complexity usually are
and the other sister all the peel"). So far as I can tell, no one has yet combined orange,
cake, and a vacation to a mountain resort next to the seashore all in the same story. STEVE
GOODMAN, You Never Even Call Me by My Name, on ARTISTIC HAIR (Red Pajama
Records, 1983) ("we tried to put into one song, everything that had ever been in
any... country and western song").
71 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 766-67.
72 Proponents of communitarian bargaining do not say directly that they prefer
communitarian methods for reasons of personal taste, of course, but they do hint at it.
See, e.g., WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 15, at 55 (describing themselves as people
"whose natural instincts lie away from the push and pull of aggressive tactics"); Scott R.
Peppet, Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal
Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 516, 531
(2005) (describing how some lawyers do not "relish" the standard adversarial conception
of the lawyer bargaining role and would like to change it to create a work environment
that is more personally compatible).
73 "Jack Sprat could eat no fat, His wife could eat no lean, And so between them
both, you see, They licked the platter clean." THE MOTHER GOOSE TREASURY 14
(Raymond Briggs ed., 1966). It is reassuring to know that I am not the only one old
enough to remember Jack Sprat. See Russell Korobkin, Aspirations, and Settlement, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21 n.98 (2002) ("[N]egotiation between Mr. and Mrs. Spratt [sic]
[would be] noncompetitive, because neither has any interest in what the other wants.")
The nursery rhyme character is Jack Sprat. Jack Spratt is the protagonist in a science
fiction series written by Jasper Fforde, though the latter is clearly modeled on the former.
JASPER FFORDE, THE BIG OVER EASY (2005).
74 Korobkin, supra note 73, at 21 n.98 ("It is a relatively rare situation in which all
the issues or goods that one negotiator considers 'good,' the other considers 'bad,' thus
rendering negotiation a completely noncompetitive activity."); Laura Spinney, Why We
Do What We Do, NEW SCIENTIST, July 31, 2004, at 31, 32-35 (describing the "instinctual
response to overvalue something when we see that other people want it"); see also
Tamara Relis, Consequences of Power, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-909518 (last visited Mar. 4, 2008) [hereinafter
Relis, Consequences] (challenging the premise that litigants and their attorneys
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not resolved by looking for something distinctive for each participant,
therefore, since much of the time each participant will want more or less the
understand litigation-track mediation in the same way and want the same things from it,
using an empirical study based on medical malpractice case data); Tamara Relis, "It's Not
About the Money!".- A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs' Litigation Aims, 68 U.
Prrr. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=909522 (last visited Mar. 4, 2008)
[hereinafter Relis, Misconceptions] (examining "why ... plaintiffs sue, and what.., they
seek from litigation"). In an interesting and sophisticated discussion, Professor Relis
revives and refines the long-standing argument against the dispute transformation
phenomenon, the process through which lawyers reframe litigant objectives into "legally
cognizable compartments suitable for processing within the legal system." Relis,
Misconceptions, supra, at 3. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 783 (describing
how clients are intimidated by adversarial proceedings into depending on lawyers "to
structure solutions that are 'legal' rather than what the client might desire if the client had
free rein to determine objectives"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of
Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 Mo.
J. DIsP. REsOL. 25, 31 ("Lawyers are said to... narrow disputes by... translating into
limited legal categories what might have been broader and more general."). Relis grounds
her version of this familiar argument in interview data from lawyers and clients involved
in malpractice litigation. Unfortunately, her discussion raises as many concerns as it
addresses. She does not deal fully with the so-called "cultural" objection to the dispute
transformation critique, for example, that litigants often describe their goals in principled
terms because principle has a higher cultural status than money-or, in terms of the
familiar joke Professor Relis trades on in her title, "When someone says it's not about the
money, it's about the money." She also does not discuss the possibility that litigants may
want non-monetary compensation-for example, apologies, admissions of error,
prevention of recurrences, and acknowledgment of harm-in addition to money rather
than as a substitute for it. What happens, for example, after an apology has been made
and the client still has to live with the costs of the harm? See Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 8, at 772 ("[t]he 'concession' of an apology from the other side may or may not
reduce the amount of money to be negotiated as compensation for the other things.").
Similarly, she does not consider the principal reason defendants do not apologize, that in
doing so they make themselves vulnerable to lawsuits for money damages. See Tresa
Baldas, Physician "I'm Sorry" Bills Continue to Spread, NAT'L L.J., April 30, 2007, at 6
(describing the growing movement among the states to ban the use of apologies in
lawsuits against doctors); Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1009, 1014-32 (1999) (describing benefits and costs of apologies in negotiation).
Nor does she consider the extent to which some litigant demands ask, in effect, for things
that can never be provided by any legal system-for example, that a loved one be brought
back to life, a vital organ be restored, and the like. All efforts to satisfy such demands,
legal or otherwise, are destined to be inadequate. Finally, her argument for why the legal
system should be required to provide all-encompassing relief-psychic and emotional as
well as monetary-that if it doesn't, "many fundamental issues within disputes will not be
addressed or resolved," Relis, Misconceptions, supra, at 47, begs the question of how
different types of harm should be compensated by a social system.
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same something. Even when interests are complementary, parties will want
to bargain over the items in dispute, not give them away. To do this they will
need to compare the value of pulp to the value of peel, for example, to know
how much of one item to exchange for how much of the other. There is no a
priori reason to suppose that these items are equally valuable or that they
should be traded on a one-for-one basis. Finding a common denominator for
comparing items in a dispute presents a new bargaining problem, however,
and one for which there is no "pulp-peel" fornula-short of hard
bargaining-to resolve.
A belief in mutually exclusive bargaining outcomes, equally protective
of each party's interests, is usually an expression of hope that bargaining will
not be necessary more than it is a program for bargaining effectively. It is
true that communitarians use Jack Sprat examples to illustrate the common-
sense point that not all value systems are identical and that sometimes
bargained-for items may be divided naturally to all the parties' satisfaction.75
Communitarians realize that most real negotiations do not involve oranges,
of course, and that pulp-peel resolutions are not literally an option most of
the time. And yet, having attracted the reader's attention, they rarely provide
more realistic illustrations from actual bargaining practice to demonstrate the
practical force of this common-sense insight. On the rare occasions when
they do provide illustrations they analyze them unconvincingly.
Professor Menkel-Meadow's discussion of the James case, for example,
probably the most popular of the early Legal Services Corporation case files
used to teach negotiation in American law schools,76 illustrates this point
nicely. Finding complementary interests on which to resolve the case would
have required Mrs. James, the defendant in a lawsuit on a consumer loan
agreement, to remain in a relationship with an automobile dealer who, over a
period of several months, had been unwilling or unable-either explanation
75 Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark, supra note 28, at 44 n.122; see also Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 8, at 787 n.123, 800 n.171 (describing the "Homans Principle":
"[B]ecause people have different preferences or values it is possible to increase the
number of outcomes in situations where several differentially valued items are at stake.")
(citing G. HoMANs, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1961)). The Homans
Principle can be overextended. Different parties to a negotiation may not attach the same
value to each of the items in dispute, but it will be the rare case where an item valued by
one person socialized in a particular culture will have no value whatsoever to another
person socialized in the same culture. Even nerds like sports, just not to the same extent
as jocks. If parties to a dispute value each of the items at stake to some extent, however,
then each item will have to be bargained over separately. None can be traded
automatically for the other.
76 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 772-75 (citing Valley Marine Bank v. Terry
James, in LEGAL SERVICES CORP., OFFICE OF PROGRAM SUPPORT (1975)).
249
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
was plausible-to provide her with a working car, causing her to lose her job,
her peace of mind, and all of her discretionary, and non-discretionary,
income.77 Expecting Mrs. James to trust the dealer finally to get things right
was wildly unrealistic given this history, and letting her reduce her interests
to money, take a cash settlement, and use the cash to purchase a working car
from another dealer was clearly the better course. 78 Yet, Professor Menkel-
Meadow relegated this possibility to a single sentence, in a footnote, at the
end of a three-page discussion about the importance of the parties making a
go of their relationship. 79 Communitarians sometimes can be unilateral about
the need to be bilateral. 80
2. Shell Games, Parables, and Fables
In this category of communitarian normative argument, intellectual
sleight of hand substitutes for analysis and evidence. Typically, a catchy
story with a clever and non-obvious outcome is used to show how a
seemingly intractable bargaining problem was made to give way in the face
of imaginative, communal thinking, suggesting that all barriers to agreement
can be overcome when bargainers stop thinking like adversaries and start
thinking like colleagues. Collectively, these stories make up a set of
bargaining parables that offer folksy accounts of practical bargaining
wisdom. Like fairy tales, the stories all have morals intended to produce
epiphanies ("Of course, why didn't I think of that?") rather than skeptical
77 Id.
78See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE
NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 43 (1991) (describing cases where
nonmonetary remedies are available and clients do not want them "because they do not
want to have an ongoing relationship with someone who has forced them into court").
79 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 775 n.82 (acknowledging that "[i]t is possible,
of course, that the parties would prefer not to deal with each other ").
80 This inclination to decide, unilaterally, what is in another's best interest, whether
the other recognizes it or not, can extend into areas of authority arguably delegated to
clients by the Lawyer Rules of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., MNOOKIN, PEPPET &
TULUMELLO, supra note 5, at 293 ("attorneys retain significant flexibility in defining the
bounds of zealous representation [when] [t]he client's interests, conceived broadly, may
be better served by a more constrained and reasoned approach to negotiation than by
initiating a contest of wills or a war of attrition ... even if the client insists upon it.");
contra Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark, supra note 28, at 70-78 (describing division of
authority between lawyers and clients in making decisions about bargaining objectives
and methods).
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reflection ("Why is that so?"), and also like fairy tales, they suffer when
examined closely. 81 I will discuss the most popular example.
In his widely read book Getting Past No,8 2 William Ury retells the
ancient story of the Eighteen Camels. 83 A father died and left seventeen
camels to his three sons.84 In a will, he left "half' of the camels to his eldest
son, "a third" to his middle son, and "a ninth" to his youngest son.8 5 When
81 See Erin Ryan, Building the Emotionally Learned Negotiator, 22 NEGOT. J. 209,
216 (2006) ("The parable model, a time-honored method of negotiation pedagogy, is
strained almost to the point of overuse, leaving the sophisticated reader craving a more
straightforward presentation of argument and idea.").
82 For the most part I will refer to the revised, paperback edition of the book,
WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No: NEGOTIATING YOUR WAY FROM CONFRONTATION To
COOPERATION (rev. ed. 1993) [hereinafter URY (rev. ed.)]. Professor Ury published an
earlier, hardcover edition under a slightly different title, WILLIAM R. URY, GETTING PAST
No: NEGOTIATING WITH DIFFICULT PEOPLE (1991) [hereinafter URY, DIFFICULT PEOPLE],
and while the content of his argument does not change much between the two editions,
his organization of the discussion does.
83 URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 159. A Google search turns up dozens, if not
hundreds, of versions of this story and its popularity seems to be growing. Recently, for
example, the Chaplain of the Alaska Legislature used it to open a session of the State
Senate. S. Journal, 24th Leg., 2d Sess., at 2639 (Alaska, Mar. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get-single-joumal.asp?session=24&date=20060331 &b
eg_page=2639&endpage=2657&chamber=S&jm=2647 (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). The
origins of the story are somewhat unclear. At least one person suggests that it was used,
in substance if not exact form, in the Ahmes Papyrus to illustrate the nature of algebraic
reasoning. The Camel Problem, http://members.fortunecity.com/jonhays/camel.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2007). The Ahmes (also A'h-mos6), or Rhind Papyrus (alternately named
after the scribe who copied it from a now lost Egyptian Twelfth Dynasty text, or the
Scottish Antiquarian who purchased it in 1858 and donated it to the British Museum,
where most of it now resides), is an ancient Egyptian mathematical text written "in
hieratic (cursive) script, as opposed to the earlier hieroglyphic or pictorial script," and
probably dates from the end of the Middle Kingdom (2125-1648 B.C.). ELI MAOR,
TRIGONOMETRIC DELIGHTS 3-5 (1998). It claims to be a "'complete and thorough study of
all things, insight into all that exists, knowledge of all secrets."' Id. at 5 (quoting BARTEL
L. VAN DER WERDEN, SCIENCE AWAKENING: EGYPTIAN, BABYLONIAN, AND GREEK
MATHEMATICS 16 (Arnold Dresden trans., 1961) (1954)), but it probably is more
accurately described as "a collection of exercises, substantially rhetorical in form," used
to train scribes and perhaps instruct students in mathematics. Don Allen, The Ahmes
Papyrus, April 21, 2001, http://www.math.tamu.edu/-don.allen/history/egypt/node3.html
(last visited Mar. 4, 2008); accord MAOR, supra, at 5.
84 URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 159.
85 In the "algebra lesson" version of the story, a stranger riding a camel happens
upon three young men who cannot figure out how to divide seventeen camels by the
above allotments. See note 83, supra. The stranger realizes that the young men have the
answer to their problem (17) but do not know to set up the unknown "x" so that the
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the sons tried to distribute their inheritance,8 6 however, they could not do so
because seventeen is not divisible into whole numbers by two, three, and
nine and the bequest was one of camels, not camel meat. Stymied, the sons
had the good fortune to consult a "wise old woman," who, after thinking
about the problem for a short time, said "See what happens if you take my
camel." 87 With eighteen camels the distribution problem ostensibly was
solved. The eldest son took his half share, which was nine, the middle son
took his third share, which was six, and the youngest son took his ninth
share, which was two; and because nine, six and two add up to seventeen, the
sons had one camel left and were able to give it back to the wise old
woman. 88 All then presumably lived happily ever after, basking in the warm,
roseate glow of a communitarian resolution.
Professor Ury does not suggest that the lesson of this story applies
literally to legal bargaining,89 of course, since camels are not a common
object of negotiation in the modem world, at least not in this country, and
wise old women also may be in short supply. But he does suggest that the
Eighteen Camels Story illustrates how communitarian thinking permits
bargainers to reach agreements that at first seem impossible by encouraging
them to think unconventionally, outside the "camel box" if you will,
"step[ping] back from [a] negotiation, [and] look[ing] at the problem from a
fresh angle .... ,9o A truly close look at the wise old woman's suggestion,
however, shows that more than unconventional thinking is going on.
arithmetic will work out. To help them, he converts their three shares into unit fractions
with the least common multiple and adds the fractions together. Because the least
common multiple of 2, 6, and 9 is 18 (2 x 9 = 18), the stranger adds 9/18 + 6/18 + 2/18,
to come up with the sum of 17/18. The problem, stated algebraically, then reads: (17/18)x
= 17, or (dividing both sides by 17), x/18 = 1, or (multiplying both sides by 18), x = 18.
The stranger then realizes that "x" must be made eighteen to solve the problem, so he
adds his camel to the young men's seventeen and the camels are easily apportioned. Id.
86 The process was complicated by the fact that camels are not fungible: some are
young and some old, some healthy and some sick, some strong and some weak, some
large and some small, and so on and so forth. For purposes of this discussion, however, I
will assume that all camels are created equal.
87 URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 159.
88 Id. It is not clear whether they gave back the same camel or an inferior one. It is
doubtful that they gave the woman a better camel, sensitive as they were to protecting
their property rights.
89 Id. at 160 (describing the camel story as illustrative of "Breakthrough
Negotiation").
90 Id. at 159.
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First, make the counterfactual assumption that live camels can be
distributed in percentage as well as whole units. This assumption will be true
most of the time in bargaining since most bargained-for items-for example,
property, goods, money, services-are divisible into sub-units, even if
camels are not. 91 If we divide the camels according to the fractions expressed
in the father's will, therefore, the eldest son would receive 8.5 camels, the
middle son 5.67 camels, and the youngest son 1.89 camels. When these
numbers are compared with the distributions of nine, six and two produced
by the wise old woman's suggestion we find that each son receives a slightly
reduced share under the percentage system than under the wise old woman's
system, but the reductions are not equal. The eldest son receives half (.50) a
camel less under the percentage system than under the wise old woman's
system, the middle son thirty-three hundredths (.33) of a camel less, and the
youngest son eleven hundredths (.11) of a camel less. The eldest son does
better under the wise old woman's system, therefore, than both the middle
and youngest sons, and the middle son does better than the youngest. The
wise old woman's suggestion turns out to have distributional and not just
problem-solving effects, and perhaps even a political component as well
("the rich get richer"). It does not so much effectuate the father's bequest as
change it, and other "neutral" communitarian bargaining techniques often
have similar effects.
The problem does not end there, of course. The reader will have noticed
that the 8.5, 5.67, and 1.88 camels bequeathed under the father's will add up
to sixteen camels, not seventeen, and that there is one camel left over. What
is to be done with it? A first response might be to divide the remaining camel
by the same percentages used to divide the first sixteen and add the results to
those of the earlier division. But that also would leave a camel residue so to
speak, as would any subsequent such division ad infinitum. This residue will
become very small in absolute terms, but it will never go away completely.
The real problem, of course, is that the father did not bequeath his entire
estate. One-half, one-third, and one-ninth do not add up to one. The principal
problem raised by the camel devise, it turns out, is not how to distribute the
father's bequest but what to do with unbequeathed property-should it go to
the state, to charitable causes, to the father's relatives in equal shares, to pay
91 Live camels might be divisible into sub-units if one thinks of them in terms of
their use rather than their person, so to speak. The sons could own the camels in common,
for example, and develop a time share system for using and caring for them, so that each
son would have the right to use the camels for specified periods of time, calculated on the
basis of his percentage ownership interest, and the corollary obligation to pay for a
percentage of the cost of the camels' room and board. This would have been a true
problem-solving resolution to the sons' problem.
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the expenses of the estate's administration, or left to wander aimlessly in the
desert? And who should make this decision-a court, the father's personal
representative, the sons, the camels, or who? The Eighteen Camels Story is
based on a trick, rigged from the outset to make the obvious solution
unworkable and an unconventional one necessary. In reality, the story is not
about bargaining at all,92 it is about estate law and what to do with
unbequeathed property. Professor Ury not only ignores this question, he
purports to answer it with a bargaining maneuver.
So the wise old woman missed the point; so what? Her trick was clever,
presumably the sons walked away happy with the outcome, and the
settlement was likely to be stable. Isn't that enough to make the story proof of
the case for communitarian bargaining? How, as a rhetorical move, in other
words, does the story represent a communitarian turn to the adversarial side?
The answer lies in the way the story attempts to deceive a reader about what
is going on in the problem and to exploit the unself-conscious tendency to
pay tribute to cleverness. Professor Ury has a point to make, that bargainers
should not fixate stubbornly on conventional bargaining maneuvers when
out-of-the-ordinary ones-in this case, temporarily expanding the bargaining
pie-might have a better chance of producing an agreement, but he seems
unwilling to subject that point to critical examination. At one level of
abstraction-that is, it is good for bargainers to be inventive-the point is not
controversial, even adversarial bargainers would agree with it. But whether
communitarian methods are more conducive to inventiveness than
adversarial ones is a debatable question and needs to be examined. 93 Rather
92 It is an example of effective adversarial bargaining if the eldest son consciously
exploited the old woman's suggestion to gain a disproportionately larger share than his
brothers. Communitarians really ought to stop using this story.
93 Like bile in Sigizmund Krzhizhanovsky's anti-utopian short story "Yellow Coal,"
base sentiments sometimes are capable of producing noble results. See Sigizmund
Krzhizhanovsky, Yellow Coal, in SIGIZMUND KRZHIZHANOVSKY, SEVEN STORIEs 184,
188 (Natasha Perova & Joanne Tumbull eds., Joanne Tumbull trans., GLAS Pub. 2006)
(1991) ("My project is simple: I propose to use the energy of spite inhabiting countless
individuals [to] set our factories' flywheels spinning again."). Bargainers might be more
inventive defending themselves in the give-and-take of an adversarial argument, for
example, than in chatting amiably in a communal conversation. No doubt, defending
oneself is less comfortable than chatting amiably-though it may be more exhilarating-
but comfort and inventiveness are not the same thing. Unfortunately, the Eighteen Camel
Story effaces this distinction. Professor Menkel-Meadow also believes that
communitarian bargainers are naturally more creative than adversarial ones and finds
proof in the familiar communitarian data-point of cake. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note
8, at 780-82 ("The principle that one should hide information about one's real preferences
is based on unexplored assumptions of human behavior that negotiators are manipulative,
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than supporting his point with evidence from actual bargaining practice,
however, and leaving it to the reader to evaluate the strength of the
connection between communitarian methods and inventiveness, Professor
Ury pulls a camel out of a hat,94 so to speak, to deflect attention from that
issue and cause a reader to think it has been resolved when it hasn't. The
eighteenth camel trick ignores the father's true interests, collapses a
substantive law issue into one of bargaining practice, and solves a different
problem than the one presented by the story-all the while pretending to
show the advantages of communitarian bargaining-and that is an
adversarial way to argue.
It is possible, of course, that Professor Ury just missed the unbequeathed
property issue; but if he did not,95 it is hard to understand why he would offer
the camel story as an illustration of the effectiveness of communitarian
bargaining. Perhaps he wanted to remind everyone of the heuristic value of
thinking unconventionally. He emphasizes the importance of being
unconventional throughout his book and sees creativity as a defining feature
of his "Breakthrough" method of negotiation. Expanding the bargaining pie
is a favorite communitarian maneuver, praised frequently in the literature
over the years for its capacity to break impasse. 96 Professor Ury simply may
competitive and adversarial. The danger of acting on such assumptions is that
opportunities for better solutions may be lost (remember the chocolate cake!)") (footnotes
omitted). Cake does heavy argumentative duty for communitarians.
94 See Alex Stein, A Liberal Challenge to Behavioral Economics: The Case of
Probability, N.Y.U. L. & LIBERTY (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-960306 (last visited Mar. 4, 2008) (describing the traps set by
Behavioral Economics experiments as "conjurer's sleight[s] of hand").
95 There is no indication in Professor Ury's discussion of the story either way. He
uses the story, along with two others, to summarize the benefits of "Breakthrough
Negotiation" and seems to assume that the eighteenth camel maneuver solved the sons'
problem. URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 159-60 (describing everyone involved in the
camel distribution problem as satisfied with the resolution). This would indicate that he
did not see the issue. On the other hand, Professor Ury is a smart man and the issue is not
obscure, so it is hard to believe he did not see it.
96 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 809-10 ("By expanding resources or the
materiel [sic] available for division, more of the parties' total set of needs may be
satisfied. Indeed, parties come together.., precisely because their joint action is likely to
increase the wealth available to both [and] have the opportunity to help each other by
looking for ways to expand what is available to them."). This maneuver also is discussed
as a manifestation of the "fixed pie" bias. Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale,
Heuristics in Negotiation: Limitations to Effective Dispute Resolution, in NEGOTIATING
IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 69, at 51, 62-63; see also Leigh Thompson & Reid
Hastie, Social Perception in Negotiation, 47 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
98, 112 (1990) (referring to the problem as the "Fixed-Sum Error").
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have called it to duty once more, this time to establish that communitarians
are the most creative bargainers. If the goal was to convince readers that
disagreement is never truly intractable and that there is never a reason to
resort to external normative standards to resolve a bargaining problem, then
the eighteenth camel trick seems proof positive of that point. But being
clever is not the same as being correct and the eighteenth camel maneuver is
just clever. Professor Ury is not the first to paper over a question of
substantive law with a bargaining technique. Communitarians as a group
have always been somewhat hostile-or at least indifferent-to the role of
law in bargaining, turning to it only when all else fails, and they do not seem
to feel any particular obligation to respect legal interests simply because they
are legal interests. 97 Offering evidence one knows to be false, however, is the
sort of move communitarians would be quick to condemn if used by others,
and they cannot have it both ways.
3. Triage (or War) Stories
Proponents of communitarian bargaining also offer what might be
described as "triage stories" to support the claim for communitarian methods
but, as with the story of the eighteenth camel, the lessons from these stories
often are of questionable relevance to ordinary bargaining practice, and the
manner in which the stories are told frequently is anything but
communitarian. Triage stories are about bargaining in its most extreme and
idiosyncratic form, conducted under "battlefield" conditions, with life and
death hanging in the balance and an overlay of nearly unmanageable tension
distorting the decisionmaking processes. William Ury's story of the "Hostage
Negotiation," also taken from Getting Past No,9 8 is a popular example of the
genre. Not only does this story extrapolate to bargaining generally from an
exceptionally unusual bargaining event, but it does so using many of the
adversarial techniques communitarians decry.
A convicted armed robber named Van Dyke, while having a cast
removed at a hospital, seized a corrections officer's gun, shot the officer, and
97 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 826 ("[W]here the parties have widely
divergent views.., one of the primary advantages" of problem-solving "is that no
judgment need be made about whose argument is right or wrong."); id. at 817 ("There is
nothing in the problem-solving model which necessarily compels parties to consider the
justice of their solutions."). Professor Menkel-Meadow's views on the role of legal rights
may have evolved over the years. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39, at 554.
98 URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 163-68.
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took several hostages while trying to escape. 99 During the ensuing stand-off,
Van Dyke threatened to kill individual hostages seriatim until he was allowed
to go free.' 00 Over a period of nearly two days, a police negotiator named
Louden, the protagonist in the story-with the help of a newspaper reporter
trusted by Van Dyke, a local television station, and a state corrections
commissioner-convinced Van Dyke to surrender and release the
hostages.' 0 ' During the ordeal, Van Dyke and Louden had several
emotionally charged conversations about Van Dyke's reasons for trying to
escape 10 2 and his conditions for agreeing to surrender. 10 3 Ultimately, Van
Dyke released the hostages in exchange for press coverage of his grievances
and a transfer to another (hopefully federal) prison. The fact that the police
(in the person of Louden) "shot straight with [him]" also reputedly
contributed to his decision. 104
The negotiation was successful, according to Professor Ury, because
Louden convinced Van Dyke that he could be trusted. 10 5 Five features of his
behavior allegedly made this possible.' 0 6 First, he controlled his emotions
and remained focused on his own objectives rather than Van Dyke's erratic
behavior. 10 7 Ury calls this "Go[ing] to the Balcony."' 0 8 Second, he
acknowledged the legitimacy of Van Dyke's points and agreed with them
whenever possible. 10 9 Ury calls this "Stepping to Their Side.""l 0 Third, he
reframed Van Dyke's demands rather than rejected them and turned them into
99 Id. at 163-64.
100 Id. at 164.
101 Id. at 164-67.
102 Van Dyke listed corruption and abuse in the state prison system, his
exceptionally long sentence for armed robbery, a newspaper report that he informed on
fellow inmates and guards (he admitted to informing on guards, but not inmates), and his
fear that he would be killed if he was returned to state prison, as his reasons for trying to
escape. Id. at 165-67.
103 Id.
104 URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 168. Van Dyke was taken to a federal detention
center upon surrendering, but it is not clear whether he was transferred permanently to a
federal prison. See id at 167-68 (correction officials would "try to arrange a transfer");
id. at 168 (remarking that Van Dyke won only "a public promise" to be transferred).
105 URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 168.
106 Id. at 169-71.
107 Id. at 164.
108 Id. at 169.
109 Id. at 164-68.
110ld. at 169.
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problem solving questions about the parties' mutual interest. 1 Ury calls this
"Chang[ing] the Game [by] Chang[ing] the Frame." ' 1 2 Fourth, he "[h]elp[ed
Van Dyke] save face and make the outcome appear a victory" by involving
him in the process of fashioning a resolution.' 13 Ury calls this "Build[ing] [a]
Golden Bridge." 114 And finally, he used "power... to [bring Van Dyke] to
his senses, not his knees," 115 making it "hard for [him] to say no" by
"educat[ing him] about the costs of not agreeing," "wam[ing]" him rather
than "threaten[ing]" him, and assuring him that the goal was "mutual
satisfaction, not victory." 116 These might have been the reasons Van Dyke
surrendered, but there is a simpler explanation that does not rely on
platitudinous neologisms or self-serving factual conclusions that seems to
make more sense.
To start with, Louden may have "prevented" something that was never
going to happen. Van Dyke was convicted of armed robbery, not murder, and
he may not have planned, or been able, to kill any of the hostages under any
circumstances. During the time he held the hostages he did not do anything
to corroborate the threat to kill them-for example, shoot someone non-
fatally-and the threat itself was an almost automatic move for a person in
his situation. It was his only source of leverage. Without some indication that
he was capable of cold-blooded murder, however, one would have expected
the threat to be empty, and it was. Van Dyke may have surrendered because
he was exhausted by the ordeal and did not have the stamina to continue or
the will to carry out his threat. Unlike Louden, he was on his own and could
not take a break from the negotiation for even a short time. Someone had to
watch the hostages. Adrenalin and drugs do not work forever, and it was only
a matter of time before he would become non-functional. Louden no doubt
knew this and simply waited until Van Dyke gave out, talking him through
darker moments of the process as needed. "Protractor Negotiation"' 17 might
be a better description of Louden's style than "Breakthrough Negotiation."
11 URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 164.
12 Id. at 78.
113 Id. at 170.
14 Id.
1 5 Id. at 168.
116 Id. at 170.
117 1 take the name from Bruce Bromley's controversial description of his approach
to litigation. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 56 (1994) (quoting a Time
magazine story describing Bruce Bromley, a Cravath, Swaine & Moore partner, as
boasting to a group of Stanford law students in 1978, "I was born, I think, to be a
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While Van Dyke reputedly explained his decision to surrender as
prompted, in part, by Louden's willingness to "sh[o]ot straight with
[him],"" 8 it is unlikely that a prison inmate of any sophistication would see a
police hostage negotiator as his friend, or would believe that state correction
officials would forget about a hostage-taking incident once the crisis was
over. The suggestion that Van Dyke thought this way seems a little
Panglossian. This was not the only hostage-taking in recorded history,
particularly in New York where the story was set, and prison inmates
presumably have a great deal of direct data from which to predict an official
response to such an event. They would have seen it all play out before.
Surely Van Dyke knew he had no leverage once the last hostage was freed,
and he must have bargained from that perspective. The most sensible
explanation for his decision to surrender, therefore, may be the most obvious
one. After Louden and the state corrections department provided press
coverage for his grievances and agreed to transfer him to a less dangerous
prison, Van Dyke had achieved all he could hope for in taking the hostages
and had everything to gain by giving up. If Louden and the corrections
department kept their promise and didn't punish him additionally for his
attempt to escape-which was unlikely-he had made a pretty good deal' 19
and that, coupled with the fact that he did not have the strength to continue,
would explain his decision to surrender. The cute "Going to the Balcony"
neologisms add nothing to this explanation. Van Dyke probably settled for
the reason most people settle; he got what he wanted and all he could expect.
Professor Ury's story is an account of a simple quid pro quo exchange, and
calling it "Breakthrough Negotiation" is a little over the top.
Assuming that the Hostage Negotiation is the story of a bilateral deal,
what are we to make of Professor Ury's use of it as evidence for the
communitarian way of bargaining? The first thing one notices is that
Louden's bargaining style is an odd one for a communitarian to recommend.
Louden lied, dissembled, manipulated, threatened, and may even have
reneged on his promise to transfer Van Dyke to a federal prison, all in a
protractor. I could take the simplest antitrust case and protract for the defense almost to
infinity. [One case] lasted 14 years. We won that case, and, as you know, my firm's meter
was running all the time-every month for 14 years."). When he first announced it,
Bromley probably thought that the "protractor" characterization was funny and savvy, but
changing attitudes toward delay in the legal system may now make that view seem
obtuse.
118 URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 168.
119 Van Dyke says as much, explaining to his cousin, a corrections officer who had
been brought to the scene, that he was "thinking of surrendering [because] they offered
[him] a good deal." Id. at 167.
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fashion worthy of the communitarian caricature of adversarial bargaining.
Even when he expressed respect for Van Dyke, he did so for strategic
reasons and not because he believed what Van Dyke said.120 He did all of
this, no doubt, because failing to use every trick and device at his disposal
when lives hung in the balance would have been unduly squeamish. But this
is why battlefield stories usually do not have much to contribute to
bargaining theory. 121 Most legal bargaining does not involve issues of life
and death, is not conducted in public or under intense political pressure for a
quick and favorable outcome, does not operate in a compressed time frame in
which decisions must be made on the spur of the moment without the
opportunity for extensive investigation or deliberation, and is subject to
normative constraints-for example, do not lie, cheat, or steal-that have
less force when life and death is at stake. Triage negotiation is not ordinary
negotiation in any sense of the term, in other words, and because of this it has
little to teach ordinary negotiation. Arguing that it does asks a reader to draw
a conclusion based on false evidence.
Professor Ury also ducks the most interesting question raised by the
hostage negotiation story, that of whether there are any limits on the leverage
available to the communitarian bargainer. For example, is threatening an
adversary a legitimate communitarian technique? Was it acceptable for
Louden to threaten Van Dyke to extract concessions and force a favorable
settlement? Threatening is based on power, not entitlement or joint interest,
and doing it seems antithetical to the qualities of candor, respectfulness, and
honesty, supposedly characteristic of communitarian bargaining.122 Louden's
use of a threat was acceptable, according to Professor Ury, because it brought
Van Dyke "to his senses, not his knees," 123 but if bringing him to his senses
12 0 Id. at 164-65 (describing how each of Louden's actions was motivated by a
strategic judgment of what it would take to control Van Dyke).
121 Bradley Wendel describes the deduction of a general principle from a fanciful
case as the resort to the "shopworn trope" of the "ticking-bomb hypothetical." W. Bradley
Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 67,
121-22 (2005). Henry Shue has the classic critique. See Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHiL. &
PuB. AFF. 124, 142-43 (1978).
122 Professor Ury describes the "theme" running throughout the strategy of
Breakthrough Negotiation as "treat[ing] your opponent with respect-not as an object to
be pushed, but as a person to be persuaded." URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 160.
Echoing the meta move at the heart of the communitarian argument, he advises a
bargainer not to change an opponent's mind by direct pressure, but instead, to "change the
environment in which [he] makes decisions." Id.
123 Id. at 168. The difference between "senses" and "knees," as metaphors, is not
self-evident. I gather Ury is saying that Louden used just enough force to win the
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had not worked-that is, he did not surrender-would bringing him to his
knees have been the next communitarian step? In answering such questions,
communitarians usually turn to suspect distinctions that permit the behavior
in question but call it something else. The distinction between warning and
threat, for example, repeated mantra-like over the years by communitarian
writers, 124 and defended by Professor Ury, 2 5 is the most popular of these
distinctions, but it is a distinction still in search of its first coherent publicist.
Functionally, a warning is identical to a threat. Each works by causing a
person to compare the costs of two harms-the one predicted by the warning
or threat and the one caused by the relinquishment of one's demand-and
decide which of the two is more acceptable. Neither warning nor threatening
makes a claim about legal, moral, or political rights, and neither is
appropriate social behavior, at least under ordinary circumstances. Each
seeks to manipulate and control rather than inform and instruct. The only
difference between the two is the language in which each is expressed; 126 and
yet for communitarian bargainers, warning is acceptable and threatening is
not. Perhaps the distinction is empirical, not analytical, based on the
judgment that a warning is thought to be less offensive than a threat. If so,
someone should write up the survey. 127 There may be no need, however,
negotiation and did not punish Van Dyke gratuitously. While this may establish that
communitarians are not sadists, how much more than that it establishes is not clear.
124 See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 28, at 142-43. Julie Macfarlane describes
the almost phobic reaction of a communitarian lawyer to a client's questioning of the
"warning-threat" distinction. The client told Macfarlane that when she, the client,
characterized one of her husband's statements during a divorce negotiation as:
[A] threat, both lawyers jumped at me and said, "Oh, no, no, no, you mustn't see it as
a threat." Oh, yeah, you're not supposed to-I was immediately jumped on by both
lawyers for even using that word-but this is the ultimate reality because it was a
threat. I mean, it was clear that . . . he was trying to bully me into-agreeing to
something that I didn't want to do.
JULIE MACFARLANE, THE EMERGING PHENOMENON OF COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW
(CFL): A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF CFL CASES 34 (2005), available at
http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/pad/reports/2005-FCY-1/2005-FCY-1.pdf (last visited
Mar. 4, 2008).
125 URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 136-38.
126 In most dictionaries, each term is defined in terms of the other. See, e.g.,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1228 (10th ed. 1996) ("threaten ... to
give signs or warning of"); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1363 (2d College ed.
1985) ("warning... An intimation, threat, or sign of impending danger").
127 Professor Ury suggests that:
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since communitarians could simply reverse the terms and approve of threats
but not warnings, if it turned out that public sentiment ran the other way.
The problem with the distinction is the distinction itself, and not with the
ordering of the two concepts. It is the proverbial distinction without a
difference. Communitarians make it, I assume, because they recognize that
there are times in bargaining when something stronger than reasoned
argumentation is needed. Some people do the right thing not because it is
right, but because not doing it would cost them more than doing it, and
dealing effectively with such people requires something more powerful than
a well-formed syllogism. The warning/threat distinction is simply a fig leaf
for concealing the fact that communitarians sometimes want to have it both
ways-free to use power when nothing else will work because consequences
matter, but also free to deny that they ever resort to pure power, because
image also counts. 28
4. Misappropriated Mathematics
In keeping with legal intellectual fashion of the last century,
communitarian bargaining theory also has a "scientistic" side. 129
A threat is an announcement of [an] intention to inflict pain, injury, or punishment
on the other side [while a] warning... is an advance notice of danger. A threat
comes across as what you will do... if they do not agree. A warning comes across
as what will happen if agreement is not reached. [A] threat is confrontational, a
warning is delivered with respect [and t]he more dire the warning, the more respect
you need to show.
URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 137. As long as we have crossed into the realm of the
linguistically fanciful, why not: "A threat is a soup that eats like a meal."
128 There are many other such distinctions in the communitarian literature. Equally
disingenuous is the one between "position," which is bad because it is a feature of
adversarial bargaining, and "illustrative suggestion that generously takes care of your
interest[s]," which is good because it is a feature of communitarian bargaining. See
FISHER & URY, supra note 28, at 55.
129 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1046 (10th ed. 1996)
(defining scientism as "an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural
science applied to all areas of investigation"). The legal academy's interest in being
scientific is a subset of its interest in being inter-disciplinary and is traceable, in part, to a
long-standing insecurity over law's place in the University. Episodes in this history, some
of which continue to the present, include "sociological jurisprudence" in the early
twentieth century, the law and psychiatry movement in the 1950s, the critical legal
studies movement in the 1960s, the law and social sciences movement in the 1970s, the
law and economics movement in the 1980s to the present, and perhaps a burgeoning law
and neuroscience/law and biological sciences movement at the present. Carrie Menkel-
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Communitarians borrow from game theory's collection of "fair division"
algorithms, for example, to defend not so much a full-blown theory of
bargaining practice as much as a set of techniques for resolving certain
recurring bargaining problems. The most well-known example of this
borrowing involves the redoubtable "one cuts and the other chooses" (OC2)
fair-division algorithm, the oldest and most extensively studied of the
mathematical procedures for producing so-called "envy-free division."' 30
OC 2 may look like a bit of folkloric wisdom more than a mathematical
algorithm, 131 but it is both, and the so-called fair-division problem 132 it seeks
Meadow, Taking Law and Really Seriously: Before, During, and After "The
Law," 60 VAND. L. REV. 555, 560-87 (2007) (discussing various interdisciplinary
movements in history of legal education). For the best discussion of the psychic forces
behind law's long-felt need to prove itself to the academy, see Thomas F. Bergin, The
Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 637, 645-46 (1968). Not
everyone is a supporter of inter-disciplinary education. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, The
Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal Education, at 5 (Northwestern University School of Law,
Public Law and Legal Theory Series No. 06-32), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=952483 (last visited Mar. 4, 2008)
(arguing that "we have no rational basis for expecting any discipline to contribute a
problem-solving idea, or any useful idea at all, to another discipline."). Allegedly, it is no
longer possible to get an academic appointment at a "top" law school without being an
inter-disciplinarian. Einer Elhauge, The Death of Doctrinalism and its Implications for
the Entry-Level Job Market at Law Schools, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 23, 2007)
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1179757913.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
130 "[A]n envy-free division is one in which every person thinks he or she received
the largest or most valuable portion of something-based on his or her own valuation-
and hence does not envy anyone else." STEVEN J. BRAMs & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR
DIVISION: FROM CAKE-CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (1996) [hereinafter BRAMS &
TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION]; see also BRAMS & TAYLOR, WIN-WIN, supra note 4, at 13-14.
The concept has been used in mathematics for almost fifty years and in economics for
almost forty. BRAMs & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra, at 2.
131 One suspects that many of the people using the algorithm to defend
communitarian bargaining don't think of it in mathematical terms either.
132 See Lowry's retelling of Aesop's fable about The Ass, the Fox, and the Lion as a
fair-division problem:
It seems that a lion, a fox, and an ass participated in a joint hunt. On request, the ass
divides the kill into three equal shares and invites the others to choose. Enraged, the
lion eats the ass, then asks the fox to make the division. The fox piles all the kill into
one great heap except for one tiny morsel. Delighted at this division, the lion asks,
"Who has taught you, my very excellent fellow, the art of division?" to which the
fox replies, "I learnt it from the Ass, by witnessing his fate."
S. TODD LOWRY, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF ECONOMIC IDEAS: THE CLASSICAL GREEK
TRADITION 130 (1987) (footnote omitted).
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to resolve is a prototypical ancient 133 and modem bargaining problem. 134
Mathematicians, like moral and political philosophers, have long been
intrigued by the difficulty of dividing goods-for example, land, personal
property-and rights-for example, to vote-fairly among multiple
claimants, as well as the imbedded difficulty of defining the concept of
"fairness" at the basis of such divisions. 135 Others have worked on the
problem, of course-the Bible and Talmud contain several well-known fair-
division proceduresI 36-but for the most part these attempts are grounded in
ideologies that are not compelling to everyone. Mathematics seeks to
transcend personal views of fairness and construct standards acceptable to
all.137
The modem effort to develop fair division algorithms dates principally to
World War II and the work of Polish mathematician Hugo Steinhaus and his
colleagues Bronislaw Knaster and Stefan Banach. 138 Starting with the
133 The procedure goes back at least five thousand years to the Hebrew Bible and
the story of Abraham and Lot in the book of Genesis. BRAMS & TAYLOR, WIN-WIN,
supra note 4, at 53. At first glance, King Solomon's need to determine which of two
women was a baby's biological mother might seem to present a fair division problem, but
the King's threat to cut the baby in half used a "division" technique as a lie detector rather
than a fair distribution algorithm. Id. at 8. The algorithm also appears in Hesiod's
Theogony where Zeus and Prometheus divide a portion of meat by having Prometheus
place the meat in two piles and Zeus select one of the piles-though Prometheus used the
technique to fool Zeus and his intentions were self-interested more than fair. See HESIOD,
THEOGONY, WORKS AND DAYS, SHIELD 24-25 (Apostolos N. Athanassakis trans., 2d ed.
2004). One gets the sense that similar procedures were in use on regular basis in caves
long before that, although perhaps not in the Paleolithic period. See R. DALE GUTHRIE,
THE NATURE OF PALEOLITHIC ART 34-36 (2005) (arguing that Paleolithic people lived
mostly in open air camps because bears hibernated in caves and made them unsafe for
humans).
134 Neal Stephenson used a somewhat unusual version of a fair division algorithm in
his popular science fiction adventure Cryptonomicon, when he had a family divide a
grandmother's possessions by physically placing them in appropriate positions in an
empty parking lot representing the two-dimensional space of monetary and emotional
values. NEAL STEPHENSON, CRYPTONOMICON 623-33 (1999).
135 BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 130, at 1 (describing how
philosophers, economists, mathematicians, political scientists, sociologists, and
psychologists have studied the "old as the hills" problem of fair division).
13 6 See H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 64-80 (1994);
BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIvIsION, supra note 130, at 6-8 (describing fair division
problems discussed in the Hebrew Bible and Talmud).
137 BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 130, at 1.
138 Id. at 30; See also Jack M. Robertson & William A. Webb, Extensions of Cut-
and-Choose Fair Division, 52 ELEMENTE DER MATHEMATIK 23 (1997); Francis E. Su et
[Vol. 23:2 20081
HOW COMMUNITARIAN BARGAINING CONQUERED THE WORLD
requirement of proportionality (the ability of each player to gain half the
value of divided goods no matter what other players do), 139 the mathematical
conception of fairness has gradually moved closer to philosophical
conceptions by incorporating notions of envy-freeness (each player thinks he
is as well off with his announced allocation of goods as he would be with his
opponents' announced allocation), 140 equity or equitability (each player
thinks the value of what he receives is equal to the value of what his
opponent receives), 14 1 truthfulness (each player announces his valuation of
the bargained-for goods truthfully), 142 and efficiency (each player receives
the particular goods he values more than any other player, and no other
division of goods will make one player better off and other players no worse
off), within increasingly refined algorithmic formulations.' 43  Those
refinements also have accommodated the complexities introduced by
multiple parties (n-party games, division by auction, division by election), 144
player manipulation of announced values, and the difficulties involved in
applying the algorithms to real life negotiation (distributing estate property,
dividing land parcels for zoning, configuring legislative districts for voting,
and the like), 145 so that the mathematical literature on fair division is now
rich and voluminous.146
al., Envy-free Cake Division, MUDD MATH FUN FACTS,
http://www.math.hmc.edu/funfacts/ffiles/30001.4-8.shtml (last visited Aug. 28, 2007).
139 BRAMs & TAYLOR, FAIR DIvIsION, supra note 130, at 9.
140 Id. at 71.
141 Id. "Equitability" differs from "envy-freeness" in the sense that the latter
involves a comparison of the divided goods based on a player's own internal evaluation
and the former involves an external or interpersonal comparison of the value of the
divided goods. Id. See also BRAMs & TAYLOR, WIN-WIN, supra note 4, at 14-15
(describing the quality of "equitability"). It also is possible for a division to be
"egalitarian equivalent," that is, equitable even though the parties do not receive perfectly
equal allocations. BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 130, at 71.
142 Id. at 72-73, 76-77.
143 Id. at 2 n.2, 44, 62. It has proved difficult to devise a procedure combining all of
these properties. Id. at 48. Trade-offs seemingly are inevitable.
144 BRAMS & TAYLOR, WIN-WIN, supra note 4, at 62-66.
145 BRAMs & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 130, at 115-26, 178-98, 204-28.
146 Id. at 30-47 (describing the Steinhaus-Kuhn lone-divider procedure, the Banach-
Knaster last-diminisher procedure, the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife procedure, the Fink
lone-chooser procedure, the Woodall and Austin extensions of the Fink procedure); id. at
68-75 (describing the Brams-Taylor Adjusted-Winner procedure); id. at 75-78
(describing the Brams-Taylor Proportional-Allocation procedure); id. at 78-80
(describing the Brams-Taylor combined Adjusted-Winner and Proportional-Allocation
procedure).
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The operation of the OC2 algorithm usually is illustrated with a story
about two children dividing a piece of cake. 147 In the story's simplest form,
the children are told that one of them will be permitted to cut the cake and
the other will be permitted to choose the first piece. This division of labor is
supposed to induce the first child to cut the cake into pieces of equal value-
which usually, but not always, means equal size-so that he will be left with
a piece equivalent to that of the second child, and the distribution of the cake
will be stable. 148 However, it is difficult to cut a piece of cake into equal or
equally valuable halves, either because the properties of the cake are not
distributed evenly throughout the piece, 149 the halfway point is difficult to
identify, 150 or it is hard to make an even cut. 151 Thus, it quickly becomes
apparent to anyone using this procedure that it is better to choose than to
cut. 152 Choosing provides an opportunity to obtain the more valuable piece in
a way that cutting does not. There are ways in which the cutter can make the
choice difficult-for example, cut the cake so that the piece with the most
frosting or filling is smaller-particularly if he has access to the chooser's
value preferences (e.g., put the cherry or nuts which the chooser is known to
147 There are several other versions of the story. For a collection, see BRAMs &
TAYLOR, WIN-WIN, supra note 4, at 1-9.
148 The algorithm does not consider who would value the cake more, who is in
greater need of a piece of cake, who contributed more to making it, or other such
"philosophical" concerns in its calculation of fair distribution. Cake may be associated
with des(s)ert in other aspects of life but not in mathematics.
149 BRAMs & TAYLOR, WIN-WIN, supra note 4, at 54 (describing the difference
between homogeneous and heterogeneous goods).
150 This would be the case if the cake was shaped as a fractal. The complexity of the
stakes and the difficulty of dividing whole collections of items make the OC2 procedure
ill-suited to much modern negotiation. BRAMS & TAYLOR, WIN-WIN, supra note 4, at 66-
67.
151 See BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 130 at 41-42; see also J.
KEITH MURNIGHAN, THE DYNAMICS OF BARGAINING GAMES 103 (1991). The differences
produced by these problems will be small when the bargained-for good is a piece of cake,
but they can be more substantial when real life goods are substituted.
152 Brains and Taylor describe some of the ways pieces of cake can differ, including
those that depend upon differences in the cake's type. BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION,
supra note 130, at 8. In a tacit acknowledgment that use of the algorithm does not
inevitably equalize the parties' positions, there is a subcategory of research devoted to
maximizing individual returns when using the procedure. Id. at 22-29; BRAMS &
TAYLOR, WIN-WIN, supra note 4, at 55-58 (describing maximizing strategies for using
the cut-choose procedure). Dissatisfaction with the consequences of its strategic use is
one of the reasons the OC 2 procedure has lost favor with modern game theorists. BRAMS
& TAYLOR, WIN-WIN, supra note 4, at 66-67.
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prefer on a smaller piece), but everything else equal, it is better to choose
than to cut. The real bargaining in using the procedure, therefore, is over who
will cut and who will choose, and there is no algorithm for resolving that
problem. Like many communitarian bargaining techniques, the cut-choose
algorithm relocates the bargaining problem, and sometimes makes it easier,
but does not solve it.
There are more fundamental difficulties with using a mathematical
procedure to solve real-life bargaining problems, however, even if the
procedure "works" in some technical sense of that term. A fair division
algorithm ignores the role of legal rights in shaping the content of a
negotiated agreement, for example, and assumes that bargainers are free to
choose the standards by which their disputes will be resolved, but this
condition rarely exists in real-life bargaining. Parties may be free to construct
their own standards for resolving disputes in a state of nature, but disputes
arising in a state governed by law and regulated by legal institutions must
take legal rules into account.1 53
While mathematical conceptions of fairness have become considerably
more sophisticated over the years, they do not yet incorporate all of the
cultural, moral, political, and legal norms that govern even the most
rudimentary bargaining interaction. 154 An algorithm works like a bug spray.
It solves a problem in a single bold stroke by isolating and neutralizing a
mechanism at the root of the problem. It is a total solution and does not
tolerate contingent, qualified, or partial resolutions of the sort inevitably
necessary in many real-life disputes. A resort to mathematical procedures is
stymied by the fact that the social universe is different from the noumenal
universe. Social data often reacts to attempts to manipulate it by changing its
form and content-it is not static or driven by mechanisms that can be turned
on or off with a single switch.155 Resolving a social dispute requires constant
153 BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 130, at 7-8; BRAMs & TAYLOR,
WIN-WIN, supra note 4, at ix (explaining that mathematical procedures are not helpful in
"arguing the merits of an out-of-court settlement" of a lawsuit).
154 See supra note 146 for examples of the increasing sophistication of mathematical
conceptions of fairness.
155 In the social sciences the propensity of research subjects to change their behavior
in response to being studied is described as the Hawthorne Effect. This concept is both
widely accepted and widely disputed. The classic study claiming to identify the Effect is
Fritz J. Roethlisberger & William J. Dickson, Management and the Worker: An Account
of a Research Program Conducted by the Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works,
Chicago (1939). On the other hand, Wikipedia reports that Richard Nisbett once called
the Effect a "glorified anecdote," and remarked that, "Once you've got the anecdote, you
can throw away the data." Wikipedia, Hawthorne Effect,
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monitoring, more than a single bold stroke. Moreover, a socially constructed
concept such as fairness cannot be reduced to a single, timeless procedure
acceptable to all. Issues of fairness are not finally and fully resolved; debate
about them simply reaches temporary resting points.
For mathematicians, the interest in fair division algorithms comes, in
major part, from the desire to eliminate envy 156 and haggling 157 from the
bargaining process. Envy, it is assumed, makes bargaining outcomes
unstable, and haggling makes bargaining conversations unpleasant. While
advancing admirable goals, this effort is likely to flounder in the socially
messy world of actual dispute bargaining. Envy is the perception of
unfairness rather than unfairness itself, and bargainers alone control the
question of how well they think they did in comparison with their
adversaries. All the "objective" evidence in the world will not convince
someone he has had the better of an exchange if he thinks, rightly or
wrongly, that he was entitled to more, and someone who has been fooled into
thinking he won big when he did not will not envy his adversary, even if he
should. Fair division algorithms do not change these perceptions.
The attempt to eliminate haggling faces similar difficulties. Haggling
permits bargainers to learn about, adjust to, and accommodate the interests of
other bargainers. It permits them to change minds, weaken convictions, make
trades, call attention to facts not fully considered, revive considerations
dismissed prematurely, and express the nature of their interests and the
intensity of their resolve. 158 For the most part, mathematical procedures
assume that these factors are static and that bargainer positions, once
announced, do not change. Bargaining is a live conversation, however, in
which the cultural, social, political, moral, and aesthetic forces that define the
parties' interests and values-along with the institutional and social contexts
in which the disputes arise-combine and recombine to shape the way
bargainer beliefs and attitudes grow, change, weaken, and adapt, sometimes
on a moment-to-moment basis. Only communitarians think that bargaining
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawthome-effect (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). Apocraphyl or
not, many social scientists would find Nisbett's comment congenial and dispute the
magnitude, if not the existence, of the Effect. It does not matter to my discussion that the
Effect may be less widespread than is often claimed, however, as long as it can and
sometimes does occur. Most social scientists concede that much.
156 BRAMs & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 130, at 4 ("A leitmotif of this book
is the search for procedures that quench the flames of envy.").
157 Id. at 67 (describing the benefit of their Adjusted Winner procedure as
"obviat[ing] the need for.. . haggling").
158 See Id. at 84 (containing a good example of this process in operation).
[Vol. 23:2 20081
HOW COMMUNITARIAN BARGAINING CONQUERED THE WORLD
positions, once taken, are never modified, and they attribute this view to
adversarial bargainers. 159 The forces released by haggling also help defuse
the anger and tension inherent in bargaining and permit the sublimation of
conflict necessary to a lasting resolution of a dispute. It is no more possible
to remove haggling from bargaining than reasoning from judgment.
Communitarians would be better off joining the effort to improve haggling,
by making it substantive and rational, rather than trying quixotically to
eliminate it.
Dispute bargaining is not a crossword puzzle or an Easter egg hunt with
a single, predetermined solution waiting to be discovered. It is a protean
political and social event whose eventual form and outcome is determined by
yet-to-be-chosen actions of the parties and normative standards-legal,
moral, and social-that influence how those choices will be made, and any
attempt to understand and influence its operation must approach it in this
light. Bargainers must believe that their interests and rights have been
understood and protected, that they have been respected as persons, and that
the terms of their agreements are fair 16 0 before they will give up their
demands and agree to settle. Fair division algorithms do not help in
determining when most of these concerns have been satisfied.
Communitarians use algorithms without acknowledging their history or
understanding the kinds of problems they were designed to solve, and fail to
include the caveats on use that mathematicians are careful to add. In other
words, they appropriate a mathematical procedure, strip it from its context,
ignore its limits, and argue (implicitly) that only a dullard could fail to
appreciate its (communitarian) implications. This is adversarial argument. 161
5. Neologism as High Theory
Some communitarian commentators replace received concepts and
terminology of traditional bargaining theory with concepts and terms of their
own and then offer up the changes as new theory. This particular form of
159 See Schneider, supra note 7, at 178 (describing positional bargaining as making
"take it or leave it" demands).
160 See Korobkin, supra note 73, at 17 (describing empirical evidence suggesting
that bargainers want the outcomes of their negotiations to be fair).
161 If one treats OC2 (and other such algorithms) as simply a piece of homespun
wisdom for dividing power in bargaining relationships, one has a different kind of
problem. Cut-choose opportunities occur infrequently in legal bargaining, and when they
do, dividing authority according to the algorithm does not so much solve the bargaining
problem as relocate it (to the question of who cuts and who chooses).
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"nominalism about realism," to reverse Arthur Leffs classic phrase, 162
appears most prominently in the communitarian adaptation of the Prospect
Theory of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. 163 Long before they learned
of Prospect Theory, communitarians were natural disciples. It is an article of
faith with communitarian theory, for example, that bargaining success is a
function of form as much as substance-that how one puts a point counts as
much as what one says. Prospect Theory provides a sophisticated conceptual
apparatus for organizing and defending these views. 164 Prospect Theory can
be interesting and counterintuitive, but the communitarian adaptive re-use of
162 See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism
About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974).
163 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 ScI. 1124 (1974); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263
(1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representations of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992); Daniel
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 1449 (2003); see also JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); CHOICES, VALUES
AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, eds., 2000).
164 Two bargainers equally understanding of and skilled at implementing the
insights of Prospect Theory would be a sight to behold, a sort of a reverse Alphonse and
Gaston. Rather than avoid making the first offer, they would take the initiative-thrusting
and parrying with enthusiasm and finesse, neutralizing one another in a maelstrom of
anchoring, framing, adjusting, and the like. Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological
Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 7-12, 14-20, 42-
47, 46-51 (1999) (describing the application of Prospect Theory principles to civil
dispute bargaining in terms of the mutually cancelling categories of "barriers" and
"remediation[s]"). As Alex Stein shows in his analysis of the well-known Blue Cab
experiment from the literature of Behavioral Economics, people can avoid such decision
errors when properly alerted to them. See Stein, supra note 94, at 6. Traps in experiments
designed to catch subjects in such errors are, as Stein says, a "conjurer's sleight of hand:
each trick can be played only once. [T]he play uncovers and thereby destroys the trick."
See id. at 6. See also J. D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393,
417 (2005) ("psychological findings do not show that people CAN'T make good
choices-in fact, there has been far less research on correcting biases than establishing
their existence"). Trout describes what he calls "inside strategies" for improving the
accuracy of judgment, that is, strategies for "creating a fertile corrective environment in
the mind." Id. at 418. His discussion is part of a larger project to show how epistemology
can uncover the normative principles underlying what Trout terms "Ameliorative
Psychology," those branches of psychology that show how people can improve their
reasoning. See id For a discussion of "Ameliorative Psychology," see MICHAEL A.
BISHOP & J.D. TROUT, EPISTOMOLOGY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN JUDGMENT 3,
11-16,26, 54-70, 154- 57, 170- 71 (2004).
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it is often just the linguistic repackaging of its most common sense nostrums
in the guise of high theory. It reminds one of the elastic uses made of the
concept of "paradigm" by the disciples and imitators of Thomas Kuhn. 165 In
an earlier era, work of this sort would have been dismissed on the ground that
"it might be social science but it's not news," 166 but that reaction seems to
have lost much of its appeal in a world where even junk science is often seen
as better than no science at all. Interesting social science work on bargaining
exists, 167 of course, and no doubt it will continue to be produced, 168 but until
165 See Jeff Sharlet, A Philosopher's Call to End All Paradigms, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Sept. 15, 2000, at A18 (discussing THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970), and the many ways in which "paradigm" was
misunderstood and misused). Lawyers associated with the Collaborative Family Law
(CFL) movement are among the known offenders. See, e.g., MACFARLANE, supra note
124, at 33 (CFL lawyers describe the fact that they use collaborative law practices in
interactions with family members as a "paradigm shift"). Professor Menkel-Meadow also
bemoans the fact that references to "paradigm shift" have become "trite," but then uses
the term in similar fashion herself. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 487-88.
166 For examples from the legal bargaining literature, see Orr & Guthrie, supra note
2, at 611 ("Opening offers, policy limits, damage caps, and other starting figures appear
to influence outcomes at the bargaining table."); id. at 624 ("negotiators can harness the
power of anchoring by setting high goals for themselves prior to negotiation."). Orr &
Guthrie also advise that "[w]hen negotiating a car purchase.., negotiators should rely on
statistical data available in such publications as Consumer Report (sic) or Kelley's (sic)
Blue Book to help them determine an appropriate deal point." Id. at 626-27. This
suggestion appears directly under a page header which reads "New Insights from Meta-
Analysis." Id. (emphasis added). There is no indication as to whom this would be new(s),
though there is evidence that some car buyers could benefit from knowing it. See Ian
Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiation, 104
HARv. L. REv. 817, 856 (1991) (describing the remarkable ignorance with which most
purchasers approach the task of buying a new car-almost half of all purchasers pay
retail).
167 See, e.g., Catherine H. Tinsley, Kathleen M. O'Connor, & Brandon A. Sullivan,
Tough Guys Finish Last: The Perils of a Distributive Reputation, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 621 (2002). The Tinsley article illustrates both the
benefits and limitations of this new social science work. Tinsley and her colleagues show,
among other things, that a reputation for "distributive [bargaining] hurts a party because
the negotiator facing that party forms negative prejudices of that party's intentions, which
then affect the subsequent interaction." Id. at 637. This will not come as news to
experienced bargainers. What better evidence of how an adversary will behave could
there be than how he behaved in the past, and what better evidence of how he behaved in
the past could there be than his reputation. More importantly, the mechanism Tinsley and
her colleagues used to introduce the independent variable of reputation into their
experiments has no analogue in real-life bargaining. Unlike law practice, where a
bargainer must deduce an adversary's reputation from a confusing and often contradictory
welter of gossip, public records, prior direct experiences, and the like, Tinsley's subjects
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it is based on data taken directly from actual bargaining practice, it will be of
limited relevance to real-life bargaining practice. I discuss this topic at
greater length in the next section. Here, I describe a few communitarian
contributions to the language (ours, most of the time) of bargaining theory.
An unexpected example of "nominalism about realism" is Dan Orr and
Chris Guthrie's article extolling the analytical power of the Prospect Theory
concept of "anchoring."'169 Professor Guthrie has written extensively about
bargaining and his work is original, intelligent, and sophisticated. Anchoring
is an interesting phenomenon, and everything else equal, bargainers generally
were told that their adversaries were "particularly adept at distributive bargaining" (or
they were not given any information about their adversary's bargaining reputation at all).
Id. at 629. They then conducted their negotiations by email, which limited the
opportunity to test this information and ruled out the use of so-called paralinguistic data
(e.g., demeanor, non-verbal behavior, attitude, and the like). Id. at 628. While the study
may be instructive on the non-controversial question of whether reputation influences
expectations, therefore, it has less to say about the more important (at least for practical
purposes) issues of how reputation is created, whether it can be manipulated, and how
pre-conceived views about it can be tested. If bargainers control the development of their
reputations to even a small extent, or if their reputations are never as clear as Tinsley's
study represented them to be, the significance of the study is greatly qualified.
168 One of the most interesting aspects of this research involves an attempt to
discover the common currency the brain uses to encode and activate the different
elements involved in cost-benefit calculations, including calculations made during
negotiations. Spinney, supra note 74, at 32-35 (describing how bidding in an auction is
associated with greater activity in the "orbitofrontal-striatal network"). Correlations
between brain activity and decision choices may not explain the judgment process, of
course, or show how it can be influenced. Syntax is not semantics, as John Searle
famously argued in his Chinese Room example (though the argument was vigorously
criticized and the debate may now have become "quasi religious," see Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: The Chinese Room Argument,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/#5.1 (last modified March 22, 2004)), but
the benefits of understanding the neurobiology of how the brain makes judgments could
be far-reaching. Spinney, supra note 74, at 35 (describing the implications of coming up
with a "reliable neurobiological model of human decision making").
169 Orr & Guthrie, supra note 2, at 605-12. Prospect Theory might be abandoning,
or at least downgrading, the concept of anchoring. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane
Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTuITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 56 (Thomas
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) ("It has become evident that an affect heuristic should replace
anchoring in the list of major general-purpose heuristics.") (citation omitted). But see
Daniel T. Gilbert, Inferential Correction, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 167 (arguing that "anchoring and adjustment []describe[] the
process by which the human mind does virtually all of its inferential work").
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are better off knowing about it than not.170 The Orr and Guthrie article has a
worthy objective, it responds to a genuine need and the authors are
accomplished commentators on the subject, yet some place in the execution
stage things go linguistically off track. Throughout the article, Orr and
Guthrie use a confusing sort of social-sciencespeak to describe the influence
of suggestion on bargainer expectation, aspiration, and behavior. They define
anchoring, sensibly, as the process of giving undue weight to the first number
one encounters in estimating the value of a bargained-for item by permitting
that number to "'exert[] a stronger impact than ... subsequent pieces of
numeric information."'" 7 1 They assert that this not always rational
phenomenon 172 is caused by a "fail[ure] to adjust... [a]way from the
anchor,"' 73 even though that is a little like saying one anchors because one
does not "not anchor." They acknowledge that this explanation begs the
question and quickly add that "fail[ing] to adjust" is caused by "a lack of
cognitive effort" in the face of "uncertainty."'174 Again, this does not shock. "I
just didn't think," is a common reaction when things do not go as well as one
had expected. Orr and Guthrie continue in this vein for several pages, taking
common-sense phenomena for which ordinary language terms exist and
relabeling them to provide readers with several new ways to express the
170 But see Orr & Guthrie, supra note 2, at 627-28 ("lawyers may be better able than
others to resist biases, including anchoring").
171 Id. at 600 (quoting Fritz Stack & Thomas Mussweiler, Heuristic Strategies for
Estimation Under Uncertainty: The Enigmatic Case of Anchoring, in FOUNDATIONS OF
SOCIAL COGNITION: A FESTCHRIFT IN HONOR OF ROBERT S. WYER, JR. 79, 80 (Galen V.
Bodenhausen & Alan J. Lambert eds., 2003)).
172 Suppose, for example, the first number one encounters in trying to place a value
on an item is greatly exaggerated. The fact that it comes first should not give it any
particular influence in the process of assessing value.
173 Orr & Guthrie, supra note 2, at 602. Orr and Guthrie offer several explanations
for this behavior and call each one a "theory" (e.g., "Social Implications Theory,"
"Insufficient Adjustment Theory," "Numeric Priming Theory," and "Information
Accessibility Theory"), though I assume they use theory here in some non-technical sense
of the term. Id. at 602-04. If failing to adjust to an anchor number is a "theory" of why
the number has a disproportionate influence on outcome, Orr and Guthrie will need to
explain the difference between theory on the one hand, and cause on the other. Each of
the "theories" listed seems more accurately described as a ordinary intellectual or
psychological phenomenon (i.e., in the order of the above parenthetical: believing the
other person when he says the number is relevant; not thinking carefully about whether
the number is relevant; according too much relevance to the number that comes first;
letting the fact that one treats the number as provisionally true for purposes of evaluating
it count as evidence of its relevance). See id
174 Id. at 603.
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ideas of "think," "analyze," "judge," "aspire," "demand," and the like.
Ordinary terminology would have worked as well.
Russell Korobkin, in an article describing some of the reasons parties fail
to settle, 175 also re-labels well known bargaining concepts to produce a
welter of new terms that add few substantive ideas to those already in
place. 176 Like Professor Orr, Professor Korobkin has written extensively
about bargaining, and his work is among the best in the field, but he has the
habit of replacing familiar terms that are understandable with personal
substitutes that often are not. His preferences for "bargaining zone" over
"bargaining range," and "walkaway point" over "reservation point"' 77 are not
controversial. However, he describes bargaining as "a process by which the
parties de-bias each other" (it sounds painful but in this context it seems to
mean argue to one another to correct misunderstandings); 178 characterizes the
175 Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789
(2000) [hereinafter Korobkin, A Positive Theory]; see also Russell Korobkin,
Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J.
ON DIsP. RESOL. 281 (2006) [hereinafter Korobkin, Impediments].
176 Professor Korobkin describes his purpose as providing a new way to think about
negotiation. Korobkin, A Positive Theory, supra note 175, at 1791-92 ("This article
presents a new dichotomy that creates a clear theoretical structure for viewing ... legal
negotiation. [It] presents not a new way to negotiate but a new way to think about
negotiation."). Since his principal concepts of "zone definition" and "surplus allocation"
describe (and run together) negotiation processes that already were well-known and
extensively discussed (e.g., information bargaining, conversational advocacy, trading and
the like), it seems more accurate to say that he provides a new way to talk about
negotiation. Id.
177 Korobkin, A Positive Theory, supra note 175, at 1791, 1794 ("First, negotiators
attempt to define the bargaining zone-the distance between the reservation points (or
'walkaway' points) of the two parties.").
178 Korobkin, Impediments, supra note 175, at 297. This newly popular (at least
with legal commentators) concept of de-biasing comes from the field of behavioral
economics. For a description, see Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 422 (Daniel Kahnemen, Paul Slovic, & Amos
Tversky eds., 1982). For an excellent discussion of the several different forms it can take,
see generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law (U. Chicago
Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 225, Harvard Law & Economics Discussion
Paper No. 495, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract id=590929 (last visited Mar. 4, 2008)
(describing examples of "debiasing law," that is, insulating legal outcomes from the
effects of boundedly rational behavior, and "debiasing through law," that is, "steering
legal actors in more rational directions"). For a description of the field of behavioral
economics, including how it differs from and adds to economics generally, see
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); Russell Korobkin &
274
[Vol. 23:2 20081
HOW COMMUNITARIAN BARGAINING CONQUERED THE WORLD
relationship between bargainer anger and bargaining impasse in terms of a
"malevolent utility function" (the extent to which the parties like or dislike
one another); 179 warns about "the second order problem caused by divergent
construals" (parties are more likely to accept a settlement if they think the
other side was respectful, dignified and honest); 180 and adopts the concepts
of "correspondence bias" (blame the person, not the situation, when the other
bargainer does bad things), "actor-observer bias" (blame the situation not the
person when you do bad things), and "naive realism" (trust your own beliefs
more than others), all on a single page. 18 1 Within a particular "interpretive
communit[y],"' 82 so to speak, this is an understandable way to converse, but
it is not the best way to talk to lawyers.183
Thomas Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science. Removing the Rationality Assumption from
Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). For a general-audience
description, see Craig Lambert, The Marketplace of Perceptions, 108 HARV. MAG. Mar.-
Apr. 2006, at 50 (describing behavioral economics as "the study of how real people
actually make choices").
179 Korobkin, Impediments, supra note 175, at 300. Korobkin explains why
settlements fail in this way: "dispositional attributions lead to anger; anger helps to create
malevolent utility functions; and malevolent utility functions reduce the likelihood of
parties reaching agreement... because the parties want not only to vindicate their legal
entitlements but also to cause pain to their adversaries. Thus, dispositional attributions
reduce the likelihood of... settlement." Id. at 301. One might paraphrase the explanation
in this way: "Parties don't settle because they get mad at what they think (sometimes
mistakenly) are the other party's motives."
180 Id. at 322.
181 Id. at 302. William Ury makes the most colorful contributions to the
communitarian bargaining lexicon in his "Hostage Negotiation" story discussed earlier.
See supra notes 98-116 and accompanying text.
182 STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 147, 171-72 (1980) (describing
the concept of "interpretive communities").
183 J.D. Trout makes a similar point when discussing the relative intelligibility of
probabilistic and frequency formats for presenting statistical data to non social scientists.
See Trout, supra note 164, at 423-24 ("People with no training in statistics tend to do
much better on problems presented in the frequency format."). But he also acknowledges
that "the start up costs [in translating technical language into ordinary language] may
exceed, by a large margin, the opportunity costs of relying on untutored judgment in
unstructured settings." Id. at 425. Similarly, I do not deprecate the helpfulness and
sometimes necessity of using technical language. Some social phenomena are
complicated and not easily described in words found routinely in Websters'. But most
bargaining behavior is ordinary social behavior and can be analyzed fully in the
vocabulary of ordinary discourse. Lawyers use ordinary language, lawyers are the
bargainers of the legal world, and one of the principal purposes of bargaining theory is to
inform bargaining practice. It would seem sensible, therefore, for bargaining scholarship
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Perhaps the most confusing aspect of this tendency on the part of
communitarian commentators to construct a linguistically original world is
that new language is not needed. Well-understood terminology is available to
describe everything communitarians want to discuss. Making up non-
intuitive substitutes-for example, what could be the intuition behind "Go to
the Balcony"-makes discussion more confusing and less productive. One
must keep flipping back to check on definitions to understand the point. At
its core, demanding that discussion proceed in one's own idiosyncratic and
non-intuitive language is an asocial act. It closes off the universe of discourse
to all but select insiders and gives those insiders a trump card with which to
shut down conversation whenever it becomes unpleasant or critical. This
move effectively insulates communitarian theory from any outside check and
makes it a "self-sealing" world view. 184 The willingness to talk with only
one's self reminds one of the communitarian criticism of adversarial
bargaining-that it is a "take it or leave it" system of conversation which
demands that others agree. 185 Once again, communitarian scholarship finds
itself modeling the behavior it criticizes.
C. The Empirical Case for Communitarian Bargaining
Much of the scholarly support for communitarian bargaining comes from
the normative arguments discussed above. This scholarship is not empirical,
and that is a little surprising.18 6 If it did anything, communitarian theory
instigated a debate over the relative merits of two distinctly different
approaches to legal bargaining, and one would think the best way to resolve
such a debate would be to compare the two approaches in operation.187 For
to use ordinary language whenever possible, if for no other reason than to increase its
chances of having a practical effect. Orr and Guthrie seem to recognize that they are in
the business of giving advice to lawyers. See Orr & Guthrie, supra note 2, at 627-28
("lawyers are the consummate expert negotiators").
1 84 CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD A. SCHON, THEORY IN PRACTICE: INCREASING
PROFESSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 26 (1974) (describing the property of being "self-
sealing").
185 See Schneider, supra note 7, at 178.
186Id. at 148-49 ("[T]here have been few empirical studies of the negotiation
behavior of lawyers," describing Gerald Williams's 1976 study as "the most frequently
cited and well-known.") (citing GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND
SETTLEMENT 15-46 (1983)).
187 It also is interesting that lawyers have not discovered the benefits of
communitarian bargaining for themselves. If communitarian methods are best for
everyone involved, one would think lawyers collectively would have happened upon that
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whatever reason, this has not happened. There are a few empirical studies of
the two approaches, and I will discuss the best known ones here, but they are
the exception rather than the rule. 188 To their credit, these studies are more
analytically interesting than the "literary" arguments made above, but they
also often start from the same faith-based commitment to communitarian
theory that characterizes the above work, 189 and lapse into the adversarial
rhetorical tactics reminiscent of it as well.
insight, even accidentally, at some point or another over the years. Law practice provides
a kind of laboratory in which to collect and test data on what produces the best results.
While "practice experiments" may proceed more serendipitously than those in a
laboratory, they also are likely to be more long-lived and be based on a larger body of
data, "number-crunching" their way to solutions. If communitarian bargaining is truly in
everyone's best interest therefore, lawyers should have discovered that fact on their own
and yet they cling stubbornly to their old-fashioned, adversarial methods. What explains
that? Professor Menkel-Meadow wonders about the same thing. See Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 9, at 485-87, 498-500. Perhaps there is something to the methods.
188 Schneider, supra note 7, at 148. This pattern may be changing. See, e.g., Relis,
Consequences, supra note 74.
189 Schneider, supra note 7, at 148 (describing how "adversarial attorneys have
become more extreme and less effective in the last twenty-five years," evidence to the
contrary, even in her own work, notwithstanding); see Andrea Kupfer Schneider &
Nancy Mills, What Family Lawyers Are Really Doing When They Negotiate, 44 FAM. CT.
REv. 612, 612 (2006) (finding family lawyers "more adversarial and less problem solving
than other types of' lawyers); Milton Heumann & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation
Methods and Litigation Settlement in New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What You
Want," 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 253, 255 (1997) (finding positional bargaining
used 71% of the time and problem-solving bargaining 16% of the time in civil litigation
practice in New Jersey); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 487 ("I fear that ideas of
adversarialism, competition for seemingly scarce resources, individual or national
maximization strategies, so-called 'clashes' of competing interests and cultures, and
vested interests in competitive habits-rather than cooperation or collaboration-
continue to thrive and to blunt the great vision of human potential at the heart of'
communitarian theory). A number of studies also have found that students and lawyers
believe misrepresentation and deception are widespread and appropriate in bargaining
practice. See e.g., Robert J. Robertson et al., Extending and Testing a Five Factor Model
of Ethical and Unethical Bargaining Tactics: Introducing the SINS Scale, 21 J. ORG.
BEHAV. 649 (2000); Roy J. Lewicki & Robert J. Robertson, Ethical and Unethical
Bargaining Tactics: An Empirical Study, 17 J. Bus. ETHICS 665 (1998); Roy J. Lewicki &
Neil Stark, What is Ethically Appropriate in Negotiations: An Empirical Examination of
Bargaining Tactics, 9 SOC. JUST. RES. 69 (1996); Scott S. Dahl, Ethics on the Table:
Stretching the Truth in Negotiations, 8 REv. LITIG. 173 (1989).
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1. The Williams Study
Gerald Williams was the first modem legal academic to study bargaining
empirically. 190 In a research program involving questionnaires, interviews,
and videotaped observations, he asked one thousand lawyers to rate the
effectiveness of the last lawyer with whom they had bargained-on a scale of
effective, average, or ineffective-and to describe that lawyer's bargaining
approach (as cooperative or competitive). 191 Nearly half of his respondents
described their last opponent as effective, and four out of five of those
opponents as cooperative. 192 Not all cooperative bargainers were seen as
effective, of course. Some were average and some were ineffective, and
competitive bargainers sometimes were described as effective, but for the
most part, Williams's respondents reported a strong correlation between
cooperative methods and bargaining effectiveness. 193 Williams concluded
from this that lawyers are best off adopting a communitarian approach to
bargaining because other lawyers prefer it and work more easily with it.194
When most of the world is communitarian, or thought to be so, one should go
along to get along.195
190See GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETrLEMENT (1983).
Williams and his colleagues updated this work in 1986 and published the results of a
follow up study in 1991. See Lloyd Burton et al., Feminist Theory, Professional Ethics,
and Gender-Related Distinctions in Attorney Negotiating Styles, 1991 J. Disp. RESOL.
199; see also Schneider, supra note 7, at 148-49 (describing the Williams study as the
"most frequently cited" and "well-known" of the empirical studies of lawyer bargaining).
Cornelius Peck published an earlier casebook on negotiation. See CORNELIUS J. PECK,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEGOTIATION (1972).
191 WILLIAMS, supra note 190, at 15-18.
192 Id. at 18-19.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 19 ("The higher proportion of cooperative attorneys who were rated
effective does suggest it is more difficult to be an effective competitive negotiator than an
effective cooperative [negotiator]"). Williams makes several additional claims. For
example, he argues that impasse and deadlock are more common when bargainers are not
nice to one another, and that being unpleasant will have long term reputational effects
that will influence the settlement of future disputes. However, he does not develop these
points or support them with evidence from his study. See id, at 50-52.
195 Williams also concluded that "it is not regard or disregard of the social graces
which determines an attorney's negotiation effectiveness," but legal astuteness, or the
ability to be "perceptive, analytical, realistic, convincing, rational, experienced, and self-
controlled" in the preparation and presentation of a bargaining case. However, he did not
discuss the relationship of this conclusion to his more general point about being
cooperative. WILLIAMS, supra note 190, at 39-40.
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While pathbreaking in many respects, Professor Williams's study has
several weaknesses that undercut its usefulness as a test of the comparative
merits of communitarian and adversarial bargaining. To begin with, it is
difficult to determine just what his survey respondents meant when they
categorized their last bargaining opponents as effective or ineffective.
Williams did not provide his respondents with a definition of effective
bargaining or a list of specific qualities to take into account in making this
determination. He talked about the topic of effectiveness at length and listed
a number of factors one might consider in formulating a definition, 196 but he
also acknowledged that views on this issue differ widely, and did not say
what he thought was the best view. 197 Thus, lawyers responding to his
survey were free to use any definition of effectiveness they liked, and there is
reason to believe they used several.' 98 One can sympathize with Professor
Williams's plight. Bargaining effectiveness, like bargaining power, is nearly
impossible to define in a non-circular fashion. 199 Almost any attribute,
resource, maneuver, or approach can be effective in the right circumstances
or with the right adversaries. The assumption that everyone must have the
196 Id. at 7-10.
197 Williams acknowledged as much when he conceded that "people have a wide
variety of beliefs about what constitutes effectiveness in negotiation." Id. at 8. He
presents a "set of hypotheses about effectiveness," but admits that not all would agree
with them and does not indicate whether he communicated them to his subjects. Id. at
42-43.
198 See Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark, supra note 28, at 20-21.
199 The difficulty is in making predictions about bargaining outcome. Often, it is not
hard after a negotiation is over to identify the factors that were influential in shaping its
result, but it is much more difficult to say in advance what those factors will be. No
attribute or resource is inevitably powerful. Ignorance, lack of resources, or even a failure
to understand the issues at stake could be a source of leverage in the right circumstances.
Still, academics cannot resist having a go at defining bargaining power. See, e.g., Russell
Korobkin, On Bargaining Power, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK, supra note 15, at
251 (Power is "the ability to convince the other negotiator to give us what we want.").
Professor Korobkin's ambivalence about the subject is evident throughout his discussion.
For example, within a section entitled "The Risks of Power," he says both that "[i]n any
situation in which a mutually beneficial agreement [is] possible, the party with relatively
less power would yield to the party with relatively more," and almost immediately after
that, "the less powerful party might resent the sense of coercion or inequity inherent in
the more powerful negotiator's demands and refuse to yield, even knowing that this
course of action will result in a worse outcome for himself." Id. at 255. If I follow this
correctly, a less powerful negotiator (however defined) could either yield or not yield as
circumstances dictate. See also Orr & Guthrie, supra note 2, at 624-26 (recommending
that bargainers both exploit the unselfconscious biases of other bargainers and adopt "de-
biasing" strategies to prevent such exploitation).
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same qualities in mind in describing an opponent as effective or ineffective,
therefore, is rarely warranted. The lack of a single, consistent definition of
one of its central concepts is a serious problem for an opinion survey,
however, and in Williams's case it was fatal. If one cannot know for certain
what his lawyer-respondents thought they were asked-or what they said in
response 2 00 -it also is not possible to know what to make of Williams's
analysis of their answers.
There is a second difficulty with the Williams study-this one involving
the categories of cooperation and competition-that further complicates the
task of assessing its results. Williams did not distinguish between substance
and style in asking his respondents to categorize their opponents' behavior as
cooperative or competitive, and substance and style are two distinctively
different realms. Take competitiveness. One can threaten, make ad hominem
attacks, use a didactic or condescending tone, or score debater's points all
independent of the topic being discussed. This is stylistic competitiveness
(even when done on behalf of a substantively correct position), and its goal is
to win the conversational exchange at the level of personal, rhetorical skill, to
be verbally quicker and more clever than the other bargainer. Conversely,
one can make strong but justified demands, refuse to change views without
good reasons, and defend views with complicated and extensively developed
arguments, albeit in a respectful, personable, and open-minded manner. This
is substantive competitiveness, and its goal is to insure that any agreed-upon
settlement protects one's rights.
It is impossible to tell from the responses to Professor Williams's
questions whether the competitiveness his respondents described was
socially rude and obnoxious behavior or strong substantive argument, and the
difference is crucial. Stylistic competitiveness is almost always inappropriate
in bargaining (and usually ineffective as well), but substantive
competitiveness is unavoidable. 201 If bargainers do not make justified
demands and take principled stands, even when they go beyond what other
bargainers expect, they will have waived their clients' interests unilaterally
and conceded rather than settled their disputes. No doubt, communitarians
object only to stylistic competitiveness. Their critique of adversarial
200 There is reason to believe that the lawyers gave the highest marks for
effectiveness to opponents who were good at routinely processing cases and the lowest
marks to opponents who fought for better than average settlements. See Condlin,
Bargaining in the Dark, supra note 28, at 20-21. If this is correct, it would undercut the
appeal of Williams's conclusions.
201 Robert J. Condlin, Cases on Both Sides: Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute
Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65, 72-79 (1985).
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bargaining, for example, is based mostly on examples of belligerent,
insensitive, and socially inappropriate behavior rather than examples of
forceful argument and justified demands. Almost certainly they do not mean
to recommend conceding claims just to be nice or to insure that everyone
comes away from a negotiation with roughly the same payoff. That is a
program for resource redistribution rather than bargaining. Communitarians
could express their objections to adversarial bargaining more clearly,
therefore, but whether they do or not, socially inappropriate behavior must be
what they have in mind when they complain about bargainers as being
"adversarial" or "positional. ' 20 2 Professor Williams's failure to ask whether
past opponents were "tough," "forceful," and "aggressive," because of what
they said or how they said it, therefore, makes it difficult to determine what,
if anything, his study shows about the relationship between communitarian
methods and bargaining effectiveness.
There is a final problem with the Williams study that plagues all
empirical research that commingles the task of collecting data with the task
of evaluating it. Williams asked his lawyer-respondents to categorize their
opponents' bargaining behavior as cooperative or competitive at the same
time that they evaluated it as effective or ineffective. 20 3 One would expect
the lawyers to tell consistent stories in this situation, to insure that their
descriptions of what happened matched their evaluations of whether the
behavior was effective, and thus it should come as no surprise that most of
the lawyers characterized their last opponents as cooperative.20 4 The lawyers
had settled with these opponents after all, and since they (the lawyers)
presumably did not believe they could be bullied, deceived, or intimidated,
they also must have believed that their opponents approached them in a
cooperative manner (or they would not have settled).20 5 The lawyers' stories
202 It may be that communitarians object only to unskillful adversarial bargaining,
not adversarial bargaining generally. I discuss that possibility in more detail shortly.
203 WILLIAMS, supra note 190, at 17 ("When they had completed the descriptive
ratings, they were asked to rate the negotiating effectiveness of the attorney they had
described.").
204 Assigning party roles to participants in a settlement exercise before telling them
the facts of the case skews participant judgments about outcome in a related fashion. See
Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Conflict Resolution and How to
Overcome Them, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
213, 224-25 (Morton Deutsch & Peter Coleman eds., Jossey-Bass 2000) ("people who
know their roles from the beginning [of the exercise] have a very difficult time coming to
an agreement. The high impasse rate.., is linked to self-serving judgments of fairness.").
205 Sometimes lawyers settle on terms they know are bad in response to bargaining
maneuvers they think are ineffective because external circumstances make settling
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may have been true, 206 but it would take direct data about their actual
bargaining behavior to confirm that fact, and that is precisely the kind of data
the Williams study does not have.
2. The Schneider Study
Professor Williams is not alone in these problems. Communitarian
empirical work on bargaining tends to confuse perception with reality by
equating what lawyers say about bargaining with bargaining itself. Andrea
Kupfer Schneider's update of the Williams study, based on a more elaborate
version of Professor Williams's research instrument,20 7 is a case in point.
Professor Schneider entitles her study "Empirical Evidence on the
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style," but it is clear from the outset of her
article that she is describing lawyer perceptions of negotiating style, 20 8 not
negotiating style itself, and by the end of the article she has turned the rule of
necessary (or at least advisable). An adverse bargainer need not always be communitarian
for a lawyer to settle. I assume this is not the prototypical experience for most bargainers,
however, and not the one they would be most likely to remember and report in a survey
about their bargaining practice.
206 For an example of how lawyer beliefs and expectations about their own
bargaining behavior do not always reflect reality, see Condlin, Bargaining with a
Hugger, supra note 7, at 60-71.
207 Schneider, supra note 7, at 152-58 (describing "updates" to the Williams study
instrument). Within the legal bargaining academy, Schneider's study is thought to be an
excellent example of empirical research and to make a strong case for the superiority of
the communitarian model. The study is reproduced at disproportionately greater length in
the Wiggins and Lowry reader, for example, see WIGGINS & LoWRY, supra note 15, at
163-74, and appears in almost all of the negotiation casebooks. While it is true that her
update of the Williams survey instrument adds many new categories of information and
choices, it has little in the way of new descriptive material about bargaining style or
bargaining effectiveness to help lawyers make these choices. She not only fails to provide
a definition of effectiveness, for example, she explicitly refuses to provide one. Id. at 195
("[T]he meaning of effectiveness is left to each responding attorney to determine."). As a
consequence, her work reproduces most of Williams's mistakes, magnifying some and
minimizing others, without offering any new antidotes. Schneider, supra note 7, at 155
(describing why the effectiveness rating scale of Williams's survey was left in its original
form). This has the unfortunate effect of piling up the confusions left by Williams's study
rather than resolving them. Schneider has extended her research into other areas of
bargaining, but her methodology remains the same. See Schneider & Mills, supra note
189, at 612. She also continues to describe her analysis as about reality ("What Family
Lawyers Are Really Doing"), rather than perception. Id.
208 Schneider, supra note 7, at 147 ("[T]he study shows ... that a negotiator who is
assertive and empathetic is perceived as more effective.") (emphasis added).
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"perception over reality" into an epistemological principle. 20 9 There seems to
be some hard-to-alter feature of the communitarian mindset that prefers form
over substance.2 10
The most confusing part of Professor Schneider's survey is her attempt to
differentiate effective from ineffective bargaining and adversarial from
communitarian style.21' She talks around these concepts at great length, but
does not work with a consistent definition of them. She does a lot of "name-
calling"-associating communitarian bargaining with positive characteristics
and adversarial bargaining with negative ones-but for the most part, the
characteristics she lists are so general in nature as to depend for their
meaning almost exclusively on the preconceptions and beliefs of the persons
using them. For example, whether an adversary is seen as "arrogant" or
"confident," "headstrong" or "persistent," "obsequious" or "friendly,"(in each
instance, the former is a characteristic of adversarial bargaining and the latter
a characteristic of communitarian bargaining 2 12) will be different for
bargainers with different degrees of self-confidence and skill, and different
levels of bargaining experience. These judgments will be even more
subjective when they involve questions of degree, such as whether an
opening bargaining demand is "extreme," or an initial position is
"unrealistic." 213 As a consequence, it is almost impossible to know what
Professor Schneider's respondents had in mind in answering her questions
without knowing a good deal more about the respondents themselves and the
bargaining situations they faced.
Professor Schneider's discussion has other interesting definitional
conundrums as well. For example, she equates effective bargaining with
209 Id. at 196 ("[L]awyers' perceptions of other lawyers are the closest we can get to
objective conclusions about effective negotiation behavior.")
210 See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text. For another example of the
communitarian preoccupation with perception over substance, see Nancy A. Welsh,
Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 753, 754 (2004) (limiting
discussion of bargaining fairness to perceptions of fairness, seemingly on the belief that it
is not possible to get the real thing: "People often disagree... whether an outcome is fair.
The definition of distributive fairness is, therefore, inevitably subjective."). See also
Tinsley et al., supra note 167, at 639 ("[C]ognitions and behaviors may be intertwined
such that one party's perceptions of the other side can affect the other side's actual
behavior."); BRAMS & TAYLOR, WIN-WIN, supra note 4, at 8 ("When a procedure is
perceived to be fair... it is more likely to lead to outcomes that are viewed as legitimate
by all the parties.").
211 Schneider, supra note 7, at 185-90. Problem-solving is her most consistent
synonym. Id. at 161-72.
212 Id. at 163-67.
213 Id. at 177.
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ethical bargaining and thinks that adversarial bargaining is unethical, 214 but
she never says what she means by "ethical." She must have more in mind
than simple compliance with the legal profession's disciplinary rules, since
many of the things she objects to (arrogance is a recurring example) 215 may
be distasteful, but are not a basis for bar discipline. The few examples of
unethical behavior she gives, taken from the supplementary comments of
some of her respondents, do not describe self-evident ethical violations, and
probably do not describe ethical violations at all if all of the facts are
known.216 She must use "ethical" to mean more than ethical in the
conventional sense, therefore, but it is not clear what this "more" consists of.
In similar fashion, Professor Schneider equates communitarian
bargaining with putting the client's interests first217-which is not
controversial-but then she assumes that making large demands and trying
for the biggest possible payoffs are examples of lawyers elevating their own
interests over those of clients.218 This is inexplicable. Most of the time in
bargaining, client interests and lawyer interests are intertwined, and a lawyer
does better for the client when he does better for himself. There are genuine
214 Id. at 166 ("For problem-solving negotiators, the highest goal is conducting
oneself ethically," while for the adversarial negotiator, "[i]f the negotiation becomes
focused on ego or making money for the lawyer, one could legitimately wonder if the
client's interest is being well served.").
215 Schneider seems almost phobic about arrogance, repeating the characterization
several times during the course of her discussion. See, e.g., id. at 147, 153, 154, 163, 165,
177, 181.
216 Schneider, supra note 7, at 166-67. The best example of this is a series of
maneuvers taken from what appears to be a plea bargaining scenario. Schneider describes
(1) "having various attorneys contact the state's Attorney" (presumably to lobby for one's
client), (2) "bringing in an attorney who was friendly with the judge," and (3) "filing
numerous meritless motions" (I take it this means "file numerous motions," since there is
no indication that the motions were denied or that the attorney was sanctioned for filing
them-"meritless" in this context seems to be a synonym for "motions I disagree with")
as examples of "dirty tactics." There is no reason to believe that any of these moves is per
se unethical, and it would take a good deal more information than Schneider provides to
make any of them unethical in context. No ethics rule prohibits any of them, for example,
and all of them seem designed to advance the client's interest. In other parts of her
discussion Schneider equates advancing the client's interest with problem-solving
bargaining. Id. at 165 (describing "maximizing the settlement for the client" as a goal of
both adversarial and problem-solving negotiators).
217 Id. at 174.
218 Id. at 166-67.
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principal-agent conflicts in bargaining, of course,219 but Professor Schneider
does not describe any of them, and most of her survey responses are too
cryptic-or her respondents too uninformed 22 0-to provide the kind of detail
needed to raise problems of this sort.
These problems aside, Professor Schneider also seems not to understand
the difference between adversarialness and incompetence. If she did, she
would not have included all forms of ineffective bargaining behavior in the
single, undifferentiated category of "adversarial" (or positional) bargaining.
Her picture of the typical adversarial bargainer-as someone who makes
take-it-or-leave-it demands, abuses others gratuitously, is arrogant,
demeaning, insulting, boastful, and the like--depicts an incompetent
bargainer more than an adversarial one. 221 Skillful adversarial bargaining
does not offend, antagonize, or insult as much as it pressures, influences, and
deceives.222 It is substantively aggressive, not socially aggressive. The
adversarial bargainer Professor Schneider has in mind is using bargaining to
work out issues of personal development or exorcise private psychological
and emotional demons, not bargain. 223 Such a person needs to be kept in
219 On the principal-agent problem in negotiation, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Andrew T. Guzman, How Would You Like to Pay for That? The Strategic Effects of Fee
Arrangements on Settlement Terms, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 53 (1996); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
669 (1986); Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503
(1996); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189
(1987).
220 A lawyer ordinarily would not know when the adverse bargainer has demanded
an excessively large percentage of the client's recovery as a fee, for example, since an
adversary's fee agreement would have been made outside the lawyer's presence. When
the lawyer criticizes a large demand as putting the adversary lawyer's interests above the
client's, therefore, he is probably saying only that he does not want to meet the demand,
not that he knows that it is motivated by lawyer self-interest. Interestingly,
communitarians describe this kind of reflexive rejection of a demand as an adversarial
bargaining tactic.
221 Schneider, supra note 7, at 164-66 (describing adversarial bargaining).
222 The plaintiffs lawyers' behavior in the pre-trial conference described in Condlin,
Bargaining with a Hugger, supra note 7, at 15-59, provides examples.
223 He is the kind of person typically named as a defendant in a Bar disciplinary
proceeding, usually for something done during a deposition. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Aude,
730 A.2d 759 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (male lawyer addressing female lawyer as
"babe" and "bimbo" during a deposition); Carroll v. The Jaques Admirality Law Firm,
P.C., 110 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 1997) (lawyer commenting: "Where the fuck is this idiot
going;" "Get off my back you slimy son-of-a-bitch," and "Fuck you, you son-of-a-bitch"
while being deposed); and Joe Jamail's now infamous diatribe during a deposition in the
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check, of course, but his problems are more substantial than the kind that can
be solved by an adequate theory of bargaining. In other words, Professor
Schneider's adversarial archetype is a catch-all category for all types of
ineffective bargaining behavior, and while this might make it easier to
criticize, it does not make it easier for a reader to evaluate the effectiveness
of adversarial bargaining.
The Williams and Schneider studies remind one of what used to be called
the "GIGO problem." 224 No matter how complicated the machine, and no
matter how many times one turns the crank, if what goes in is what is left on
the floor after all the good meat has been used, the machine will produce
sausage. The Williams study was analytically complicated, and Professor
Williams manipulated his data in a sophisticated manner, but one couldn't tell
what the data meant. In the end, this quality made the study's results difficult
to understand. Professor Schneider's failure to clear up the confusions in
Williams's descriptions of bargaining styles, and to provide the definition of
bargaining effectiveness that is missing in his study, makes her study an
empiricist form of "practicing [your] mistakes."225 Moreover, her adjectival
Paramount Communications case, reproduced in Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 53-54 (Del. 1994) ("Don't Joe me, asshole. You can
ask some questions, but get off of that. I'm tired of you. You could gag a maggot off a
meat wagon."), along with his response to the Delaware Supreme Court when invited to
explain his comments: "I'd rather have a nose on my ass than go to Delaware for any
reason." Brenda Sapino, Jamail Unfazed by Delaware Court's Blast, TEX. LAW., Feb. 14,
1994, at 11. To view Joe Jamail in action, see YouTube, "Texas Style Deposition,"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-ZlxmrvbMeKc (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
224 GIGO stands for Garbage In, Garbage Out, a computer science term expressing
the informal rule that the integrity of a computer's output depends upon the integrity of its
input. The term has fallen out of use as computer programs have become more
sophisticated and checks have been built into them to reject improper input. Reputedly,
the term was coined by Wilf Hey, the person who developed Report Program Generator,
an IBM programming language similar to COBOL and used for the production of large
system reports. See The Free Online Dictionary of Computing, "GIGO,"
http://foldoc.org/index.cgi?query=gigo (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). GIGO also can be
used to mean Garbage In, Gospel Out, to express the idea that humans sometimes accept
the output of computer systems on faith. See Wikipedia, Garbage In, Garbage Out,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garbage in,_garbageout (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). No
one will be surprised to learn that there is a GIGO website and blog. Garbage In, Garbage
Out, http://www.gigo.com/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). There are a lot of lonely souls out
there dealing badly with the quiet desperation problem.
225 See Robert J. Condlin, Learning from Colleagues: A Case Study in the
Relationship Between "Academic" and "Ecological" Clinical Legal Education, 3
CLINICAL L. REv. 337, 345 (1997) (describing the lack of any necessary relationship
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categories are so open-ended and susceptible to idiosyncratic interpretation
that she may do no more than record the insecurities, fears, doubts,
limitations, and prejudices of her respondents. No doubt, some of the
judgments reported to her are correct-it is not likely that everyone was
talking about personal history-but without some independent vantage point
from which to evaluate the accuracy of the answers, it is impossible to tell
which answers are trustworthy and which are not.
Professor Schneider recognizes that some of her respondents might have
projected their own bargaining styles onto adversaries and evaluated the
adversaries in that light, punishing those who were seen as different and
rewarding those who were seen as alike.226 To protect against this, she asked
her respondents to characterize their bargaining styles using the same
standards they applied to the adversaries, and then she compared the two sets
of characterizations. She expected that "[b]y looking at the average
difference between the responding attorney and the studied attorney, [she
could] roughly assess the differences between them as negotiators... [and
then] by comparing these average differences to effectiveness rating[s], [she
could] try to see whether the difference in negotiation approach led to lower
effectiveness ratings." 22 7 While admirable, this maneuver does not take into
account the possibility that her respondents were not very good reporters of
their own bargaining styles. Most people are not; beliefs, hopes,
between doing something more than once and getting it right-it is possible to just
"practice [one's] mistakes").
226 Schneider, supra note 7, at 193. Professor Schneider assumes her respondents
"would have at least some understanding of the other side's motivations even if [they]
were not particularly empathetic," and that they would be "more accurate in describing
and evaluating effective negotiation behavior [of their adversaries] than non-lawyers"
because they have "experience" in making such judgments. Id. at 195. By "experience"
Professor Schneider means that the respondents were educated in the same way as their
adversaries, had similar cultural backgrounds, and were familiar with all the same legal
idioms and customs. The difficulty with this argument is that the kind of judgments
Professor Schneider asked her respondents to make were judgments about ordinary social
behavior more than bargaining methodology. She asked about friendliness, arrogance,
attentiveness, respectfulness, stubbornness, belligerence, courtesy, and the like, and one
doesn't develop any particular expertise in identifying these qualities by going to law
school. Though, in all fairness, law school provides plenty of opportunities to do
fieldwork.
227 Id. at 193. More specifically, she asked each respondent to rate the importance of
each of fourteen negotiation goals on a scale of one to five. Previously, she had asked
them to rate their last negotiation adversary on the same scale. She assumed that
"attorneys with a similar approach to negotiation will have similar goals in the
negotiation." Id. at 193.
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expectations, and defenses get in the way.228 If the respondents had positive
images of their own styles (and it seems reasonable to expect that most
would), they probably took those images from the received wisdom of the
settings in which they were trained and had practiced (Where else?). Since
Professor Schneider's respondents were young in comparison with the Bar as
a whole,229 their particular versions of received bargaining wisdom would
have been relatively current230 and relatively academic, and thus would have
reflected the popularity of the communitarian model. That being the case,
one would expect them to think of their bargaining in communitarian terms,
even if it was not.23 1
The fact that the respondents were younger than members of the Bar on
average also may mean that they had not yet internalized the conventions of
ordinary bargaining practice.232 These conventions are generally more
adversarial than social, and Schneider's respondents might have thought
themselves incapable of such behavior. When given a choice to describe
themselves as likable or arrogant-and Professor Schneider's survey reduces
to that choice if socialization and self-awareness are taken out of the
228 Argyris and Schon show how this is so. See ARGYRIS & SCHON, supra note 184,
at viii (finding it normal, not exceptional, for people to believe one thing and act as if
they believed something totally different). The social science literature on behavioral
forecasting also suggests that people are not good reporters on their own social
experiences generally. For example, people do not predict their future affective states,
preferences, and behavioral responses accurately, tending to believe that "their future
reactions will be more intense than they actually are." They also are "overly optimistic in
how quickly they can accomplish their goals and tasks [and] are overly optimistic [about]
how successful they will be in achieving desired outcomes." See Kristina A. Diekman,
Ann E. Tenbrunsel, & Adam D. Galinsky, From Self-Prediction to Self-Defeat:
Behavioral Forecasting, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and the Effect of Competitive
Expectations, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 672, 672-83 (2003) (summarizing the
literature). In short, most people have idealized visions of themselves and their behavior,
and this causes them to describe their experiences in overly positive terms. To understand
bargaining, it is necessary to watch people bargain, not ask them how they did it.
229 Schneider, supra note 7, at 159.
230 This would be true even if most of them had not taken a course in negotiation, as
Schneider reports. Schneider, supra note 7, at 192. All they needed was a familiarity with
current law school intellectual fashion.
231 See Heumann & Hyman, supra note 189, at 255 (finding that positional
bargaining is used 71% of the time and problem-solving bargaining 16% of the time in
civil litigation practice in New Jersey).
232 See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to be
Trustworthy when Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REv. 181 (1981); Thomas
F. Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 99 (1982); describing the
phenomenon of bargaining conventions and norms.
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picture-most will choose likable. To know whether this is an accurate
characterization, however, one would need to see the respondents actually
bargain, and Professor Schneider has no direct data on bargaining. In effect,
her attempt to control for projection bias ends up comparing behavior (the
adverse negotiators') with theory (the respondents'), rather than behavior with
behavior or theory with theory. If her argument was a syllogism, it would
have an undistributed middle term.2 33
3. The Macfarlane Study
Perhaps the most interesting of the empirical studies of legal bargaining,
notable for its balance and even-handedness, is Julie Macfarlane's
examination of the Collaborative Family Law (CFL) movement in the United
States and Canada.234 The CFL phenomenon is the latest in a long line of
"true believer" 235 systems popular with the anti-adversarial faction of the
233 Professor Schneider discusses other objections that might be made to her survey,
but strangely, she does not mention the problem of asking subjects to collect and evaluate
data at the same time. Schneider, supra note 7, at 193. She does not seem to see how the
judgment about effectiveness could influence the way in which behavior was recalled and
described. Moreover, asking lawyers to reconstruct past events without any opportunity
to consult records, interview witnesses, or use any of the tools of historical research is a
little like asking randomly selected citizens to write gospels. That has been tried, and the
results were not uniformly satisfactory. See BART EHRMAN, LOST CHRISTIANITIES: THE
BATTLES FOR ScRIpTURE AND TiiE FAITHs WE NEVER KNEw 160-61, 181-202 (2003)
(describing the "vitriolic attacks," "polemical treatises," and "personal slurs" used by
early Christians in factional arguments over which particular Christian beliefs and
practices to affirm in the gospels).
234 MACFARLANE, supra note 124.
235 Macfarlane's study is replete with CFL practitioner statements, some almost
mystical, emphasizing the importance of using CFL methods. Representative examples
include: "I don't really care about whether the outcome is optimal in terms of dollars and
cents but that [my client] and I live up to our collaborative principles." Id. at 59
(alteration in original).
I would say it's [the CFL approach to others] something that I find now that I can't
turn "on" or "off." It's just basically "on" now. In fact, I even find from a personal
standpoint even the way that I interrelate with my spouse and my family has
changed because of it.
Id. at 33.
I don't sit there and go through the three inches of information that they [i.e., the
clients] bring me, and I'm not going to do that. I don't need to go through and kind of
come up with a plan or an idea of how we should approach it beforehand. And I kind
of like that. In a way, the less I know, the cleaner I can make my negotiations, too.
289
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
legal academy and Bar.236 Macfarlane, a supporter of collaborative law
practice, describes the phenomenon as "one of the most significant
developments in the provision of family legal services in the last 25
years."237 CFL bargaining is identified by its "contractual commitment
between lawyer and client not to resort to litigation to resolve the client's
problem"238 should bargaining fail, and its corollary practice of having
lawyers and clients settle their differences in face-to-face, whole-group
meetings (often referred to as "Four-Ways"), 239 rather than in meetings
between just lawyers. The presence of clients at settlement, it is believed,
eliminates-or at least reduces-the posturing and antagonism that
characterize the competitive dynamics of "lawyer-to-lawyer" interaction.240
"Without the potential of litigation in the background," CFL practitioners
believe, "lawyers will take different steps and adopt different strategies for
negotiation. "24 1 They will not do things that are "seen as offensive... [such
as] 'paper' the file" and will be "strongly motivated to settle. '242 In the words
of an early proponent, CFL offers "a way to approach a person, with whom
one has a perceived conflict, with a request for an honest and detailed
examination of the problem, in a way that also offers an absolute and
irrevocable commitment to do so in a non-adversarial manner. "243
Id. at 36-37. "I give as little legal advice as possible, because there is so much
contamination and you are trying to get them focussed back on life issues." Id. at 37.
236 Not everyone is a supporter of CFL practice. The Ethics Committee of the
Colorado Bar, for example, recently found the signature collaborative law process of
withdrawing if settlement talks collapse per se unethical. Colorado Bar Association
Ethics Committee, Ethics Opinion 115: Ethical Considerations in the Collaborative and
Cooperative Law Context, (adopted Feb. 24, 2007),
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/subID/10159/Ethics-Opinion- 115:-Ethical-
Considerations-in-the-Collaborative-and-Cooperative-Law-Contexts,-02/24// (last visited
Mar. 4, 2008). Other states have expressed related reservations. Jill Schachner Chanen, A
Warning to Collaborators, A.B.A. J., May 2007, at 22, 23.
237 MACFARLANE, supra note 124, at vii.
238 ld ("If the client decides that legal action is ultimately necessary.., the
collaborative lawyer ... must withdraw and receive no further remuneration for work on
the case").
239 The term "Four-Ways" takes its name from the combination of the parties and
the parties' lawyers in the typical two-party dispute.
240 MACFARLANE, supra note 124, at 29.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Robert W. Rack, Settle or Withdraw: Collaborative Lawyering Provides
Incentives to Avoid Costly Litigation (Spring 1998),
290
[Vol. 23:2 20081
HOW COMMUNITARIAN BARGAINING CONQUERED THE WORLD
Whether the CFL movement is more hype than reality is an interesting
question-good arguments exist on both sides-but the question is also well
beyond the scope of this article. CFL methods do not seem to produce
settlements that are very much different from those produced by traditional
bargaining methods (even its practitioners acknowledge that)2 44 but they
might have a "value-added" dimension that makes them more satisfying and
effective to use.24 5 Be that as it may, the relevant question for our purposes is
whether Professor Macfarlane's study tells us anything new about the
comparative effectiveness of communitarian bargaining. Like the Williams
and Schneider Studies before it, the Macfarlane Study is based on data
collected from lawyer responses to opinion surveys and interviews. The
difference is that Macfarlane's questions were more open-ended than those of
her predecessors, and the answers she received were correspondingly more
wide-ranging. This, along with the fact that her respondents were selected for
their self-identification with CFL practice rather than randomly, may account
for the fact that the answers often read more like testimonials to CFL
methods than descriptions of effective bargaining generally. The responses
frequently are vague, conclusory, a little overwrought, and lacking in the
evidentiary detail needed to explain what they mean or why they should be
believed. 246 Many also have a kind of "peace, love, and harmony" aura about
http://www.collablawtexas.com/articlesettle-or-withdraw.cfm (last visited Mar. 4,
2008).
244 MACFARLANE, supra note 124, at 57. They also admit that they revert to
adversarial methods on occasion, usually when communitarian methods are not
reciprocated and in "endgame" situations. Id. at 31-32. This is reminiscent of Professor
Urys hostage negotiator who brought his adversary to his senses only because it was not
necessary to bring him to his knees. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
245 At least this is what CFL proponents claim. MACFARLANE, supra note 124, at
58-59 (quoting CFL practitioners describing these value-added features as including
"enhance[d] ... communication between the parties which enable[s] them to explore
their understanding of what [feels] 'fair,"' the opportunity to "negotiate creative
alternatives to support, custody and access," the ability to "explore [certain kinds of
issues] more deeply," and "more effective involvement and joint decision making in co-
parenting"). On the other hand, Macfarlane concludes that "the level of emotional
resolution achieved via the [CFL] process was perhaps not as great as the lawyers had
anticipated or hoped for at the outset-nor as deep as they believed was achieved by the
end." Id. at 60. As one client put it, "Trust building is a big.., and ... deep issue in a 20
year relationship, and this is probably too deep for a legal process [CFL] to handle." Id.
Or, as another said, sometimes "the CFL process is not that different from a traditional
lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation, 'mostly lawyer-talk, just more polite,"' particularly if
"cooperation [is] not forthcoming from the other side." Id. at 31.
246 MACFARLANE, supra note 124, at 30-31 ("there is much [less] opportunity for
polarization and mistrust [in CFL];" "the dynamics of [CFL] change how people behave,
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
them that reminds one of the Sixties (and an accompanying authoritarian
shadow also reminiscent of that period),247 that seems to say, "technique is
bad, rights talk contaminates, all disputes have right answers and you will
find your way if you just chill out."
To her credit, Macfarlane interprets these answers rather than accepts
them. She appreciates that many CFL practitioners want to believe that their
methods work and have convinced themselves that they do based on limited
if not non-existent data. She points out gaps and inconsistencies in the
answers, describes considerations left out, and constructs a reasonably
complete picture of CFL practice, warts and all. She sees the question of
CFL's effectiveness as a debatable one, and ends up describing a qualified
and enhanced version of the method as a more attractive option than the
original. She presents a "for and against" case with balance and integrity,
once they start hearing the reality of their case from other people;" "I actually find [CFL]
quite different;" there is a "conscious avoidance of... adopting the extremes;" I have
the confidence to say to my client 'Let's not talk about [inflated demands], it's a waste of
your time;" "positional bargaining simply does not work in CFL"). See also Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 8, at 500 ("I believe that 'small is beautiful' and 'local is global' [and
that] we should all keep working ... to make the world a better, more peaceful place
through negotiation.").
247 Comments by CFL clients illustrate the method's authoritarian side. For example,
some clients saw the constant reminders by CFL attorneys to remain cooperative and
focus on the interests of the group as "an attempt to impose a false 'harmony' on the
situation," and forced community can be oppressive. MACFARLANE, supra note 124, at
34. Others were "sometimes mystified by the lengths to which their lawyers believe[d]
they must go to remove the possibility of litigation, and wonder[ed] why counsel could
not simply be trusted to use their best judgment in this eventuality." Id. at 39.
[Another didn't] quite understand the need for such a strong bias against the CFL
attorney representing [the client] in the case of later litigation. After the CFL process
has failed, [the dispute] becomes just another type of case and ... having all the
background information and knowing the other parties would make for a smoother
litigation.
Id. at 40. Yet another client explained how CFL representation could be constraining:
"After an estimated $24,000 in professional fees and nine months of negotiations-with
little accomplished-it was difficult to switch tacks and litigate. 'Now that we're this far,
it's hard to leave."' Id. at 39. Surprisingly, CFL representation often was as expensive as
traditional representation and as time consuming as well. Id. at 79. Finally, and in the best
traditions of authoritarianism generally, CFL lawyers were encouraged to report one
another to the CFL group when they became "unnecessarily adversarial" and violated the
CFL "'club' culture." Id. at 33. Some CFL groups had even begun to develop expulsion
procedures (though there was no indication yet that the procedures were conducted in
public, to a drum roll background, and in front of the entire Battalion). MACFARLANE,
supra note 124, at 33.
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shows how communitarian and adversarial practices can work together to
supplement one another, and how the two approaches in combination can be
more effective than either standing alone. She could do more to describe this
conjoined point of view and probably will if she continues to work in the
field.24 8 Even if she does not, her present study demonstrates that both
adversarial and communitarian bargaining methods have value, and that it is
possible to construct a hybrid method of bargaining based on the best
features of each. Her study is an example of a genuinely communitarian
approach to the discussion of bargaining theory-one which is inclusive,
collegial, and bilateral. It is an example of communitarian theory being
communitarian.
4. Future Studies
There are dozens of additional empirical studies of both communitarian
and adversarial bargaining, 249 some more carefully conducted than those just
248 It is not clear whether collaborative law practice is a long-standing research
interest of Macfarlane's or just an occasion for writing a commissioned report. Her study
appears to be a one-time event, prepared for presentation to the Family, Children and
Youth Section of the Department of Justice for Canada.
249 There is another large body of work, nominally about mediation, that also
contains a good deal of comparative analysis of different bargaining methods (because
mediation is just multi-party bargaining). It is common for articles of this sort to make the
"value added" argument, that parties prefer communitarian methods because they provide
greater party control over the settlement process, permit a wider range of possible
resolutions, make the experience of bargaining more personable, and produce greater
party compliance with agreed-upon outcomes. These claims are noteworthy as much for
the number of times they have been repeated as for the evidence marshaled in their
support. Most of the early work of this sort was grounded, directly or indirectly, on a
1981 study of mediation in Maine that subsequent studies did not always support.
Compare Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An
Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237 (1981) (stating that mediation more likely to
produce greater party compliance with agreements than litigation), with Neil Vidmar, The
Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and an Empirical Investigation,
18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 515 (1984) (stating that whether defendant admits partial liability
is a more important characteristic than the type of procedural forum in predicting extent
of party compliance with agreements). The debate continued for one more round.
Compare Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, The Relative Significance of
Disputing Forum and Dispute Characteristics for Outcome and Compliance, 20 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 439 (1986), with Neil Vidmar, Assessing the Effects of Case Characteristics
and Settlement Forum on Dispute Outcomes and Compliance, 21 LAW & Soc'y REV. 155
(1987). McEwen and Maiman did not give up. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J.
Maiman, Explaining a Paradox of Mediation, 9 NEGOT. J. 23 (1993) (arguing that
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described and others less so, but invariably these studies are based on either
lawyer opinions about bargaining effectiveness or patterns in the way
university students play bargaining games. Judgments based on lawyer
opinions are not trustworthy because lawyers do not always bargain in the
manner they say (or think) they do. Their descriptions of bargaining are often
more self-tribute or self-deception than self-examination, shaped by hopes,
expectations, defenses, and preconceived notions more than what happens on
the ground.250 Judgments based on student game-playing, on the other hand,
ignore both the effects of professional socialization and institutional setting
on bargaining behavior, and the way in which the distinctive personal and
social networks within which lawyers work influence the practices and
values they internalize and live by.251 Students live in a world of networks,
mediation is particularly powerful and effective when parties are reluctant to enter the
process voluntarily); see also Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An
Overview of Research Results, 19 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 451 (1985) (finding
greater compliance with mediation awards than adjudicated judgments); Roselle L.
Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in the Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process
and Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 323 (1995) (finding that compliance is
not significantly related to defendants' outcome). For the best background discussions,
see generally THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY
MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993); E.
ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Lawrence B. Solum,
Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004); Laurens Walker et al., Reactions of
Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 295
(1974).
250 Condlin, Bargaining with a Hugger, supra note 7, at 60-71.
251 Barbara Bergmann makes a similar point about the empirical methods of
"professional economists." Barbara R. Bergmann, Needed: A New Empiricism,
ECONOMISTS' VOICE 1 (March 2007), available at
http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss2/art2/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
[E]ven the experimentalists and behaviorists do little if any direct interacting with
the people who manage businesses as they actually conduct their affairs. It is
assumed that the students they pay to come to their laboratories are stand-ins for
them, and that the students' behavior patterns will predict that of the managers. One
might argue that economists would do best if they adopted the strategy of
anthropologists who go to live with the tribe they are studying and become
participant-observers.
Id. at 2. Janet Alexander's study of Silicon Valley securities litigation is an excellent
example of such an anthropological study. Alexander, supra note 43. For other
discussions of the differences between experienced and inexperienced bargainers, see
Russel Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look
as the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 113 (1997) (summarizing their
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institutions, values, and practices as well, of course, but one peculiar to
schooling, and while they often bargain in interesting ways, they do not do so
in the same ways as lawyers. In the end, neither lawyer opinion surveys nor
student game-playing patterns provide the type of data needed to construct an
accurate profile of lawyer bargaining.
The best way to study lawyer bargaining is to study it directly, based on
recordings and transcripts of actual lawyer negotiation. This kind of data
would eliminate debates about how lawyers behave in negotiation and permit
commentators to focus on the more interesting questions of what the
behavior means, how it is perceived, and what are its effects. Most
commentators do not work with such data because it is too difficult to
collect. Clients and lawyers would have to consent to having negotiations
recorded, for example, and most will not. Information exchanged in
negotiation may or may not be privileged,252 but it is at least private, and in
experiments as showing that "lawyer subjects were not affected to nearly the same degree
as litigant ... subjects by the framing, anchoring, and equity-seeking variables tested");
id. at 121-22 ("our results suggest that lawyers are more likely to explicitly or implicitly
employ expected financial value calculations when considering litigation options"); Linda
Babcock, Henry S. Farber, Cynthia Fobian, & Eldar Shafir, Forming Beliefs about
Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 289, 294-95 (1995) (describing differences in the way students and lawyers
calculate expected adjudicated outcome); Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers,
Illusions of Judgment & Litigation, 59 VAND. L. REV. 2017, 2028-33 (2006) (describing
how professional "reinsurers resisted the influence of anchoring on their judgments," but
"student subjects" did not); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A
Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 757 (2000)
("novices in a field or one-shot players are unlikely to have had enough experience to
have received adequate feedback" to adjust for their biases); Orr & Guthrie, supra note 2,
at 622-23 ("anchoring effects are somewhat less pronounced among experienced
negotiators"); Hazard, supra note 232; Guernsey, supra note 232; Walter W. Steele, Jr.,
Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (1986).
252 Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and its state law analogues are the
principal regulations governing the availability in discovery of information disclosed
during settlement negotiations. For discussions of these rules, see Jane Michaels, Rule
408: A Litigation Mine Field, 19 LITIG., Fall 1992, at 34; Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the
Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955 (1988); Russell
Korobkin, The Role of Law in Settlement, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
254 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., Jossey-Bass 2005). Private
information disclosed in negotiation also can be regulated by confidentiality agreements
between the parties, though there are many policy objections to such agreements and state
laws often preclude them. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Public Access to Private
Settlements: Conflicting Legal Policies, 11:6 ALT. TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 85 (June
1993); Laurie K. Dord, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283 (1999).
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most instances there is no particular reason clients would want to make it
public. Lawyers also will be reluctant to reveal the strategies and techniques
they think give them an advantage in bargaining with others, though this
advantage is easily overestimated.
If live bargaining data is not an option, scrupulously faithful facsimiles
are the next best possibility. The most useful of these alternatives is the well
constructed simulated negotiation, one based on an actual bargaining case,
conducted spontaneously-not according to a script-by practitioners
experienced in the matters being negotiated, working with actual case
materials (documents, physical evidence, live witnesses, and the like), in
real-life contexts, and under real time conditions. 253 Such simulations won't
reproduce actual negotiation perfectly, since it is almost impossible to
simulate the social relationships and interpersonal histories of the parties,
witnesses, and lawyers that make up an extended real-life negotiation. 254 But
simulations will reproduce the full range of skill maneuvers that constitute
the bargaining conversation, and these maneuvers are the central focus of
much negotiation scholarship.
With data of this sort it would be possible to discuss such questions as
whether an adversary's comments were threatening or the listener unduly
defensive, whether an adversary's demands were excessive or the listener
excessively stingy, whether an adversary was loud and belligerent or the
listener overly sensitive, whether an adversary was arrogant or the listener
unusually insecure, and the like. Each of these topics triggers strong
emotions in lawyers, and relying on negotiation participants both to describe
such behavior accurately and evaluate it objectively often produces a kind of
vicious analytical circle. To avoid circularity, one needs a record of what
happened that is constructed independently of the parties' beliefs about the
effectiveness of the behavior involved. Tape recordings and transcripts of
253 Off and Guthrie seem to agree. Orr & Guthrie, supra note 2, at 614. They base
their analysis of anchoring effects in negotiation, for example, on observations of
simulated negotiations and exclude data taken from survey reports. Id. Bargaining
scholarship needs dozens, if not hundreds, of such negotiation case studies. Collectively,
they would constitute a phenomenology of bargaining, providing images of all of the
variations in bargaining styles.
254 It also is impossible for a simulated negotiation to trigger all of the motivational
forces present in real-life bargaining. In simulations there are no sympathetic clients to be
helped, no large fees to be earned, and no causes to advance. The complete absence of
real-world consequences and relationships takes these factors out of the picture. A
simulated negotiation triggers only the lawyer's ego interest in performing successfully.
Ego is a powerful and pervasive force, however, and in some circumstances it has more
influence on lawyer behavior than any of the above factors.
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simulated negotiations hold out the greatest hope for producing such a
record.
The empirical arguments for communitarian bargaining differ in
numerous respects but they also have several qualities in common. They
make general claims about bargaining practice based on cartoon data about
stylized, overly simple, non-legal disputes in a manner that is more often
gimmicky than real. They tout maneuvers and techniques that work in
limited contexts and have little application to ordinary bargaining problems
as examples of best bargaining practice across the board. And they defend
these claims in a manner that bespeaks more of prestidigitation than reasoned
elaboration. The complete case for the communitarian method, both its
normative and critical dimensions, rejects the possibility of intractable
conflict and the existence of incommensurable values and beliefs, ignores the
compressed time frames and constricted social relationships within which
bargaining is conducted, and closes its eyes to many of the practical
constraints of real-life situations that do not fit easily into its idealized
communal model of bargaining interaction. It also is gratuitously competitive
and unfair in the way it describes and dismisses adversarial approaches to
bargaining, misleading in the manner it reports and uses empirical data, and
imperialist in the attitude it takes toward the world of bargaining theory
generally. It is based mostly on prescriptive writing grounded in aesthetic
and ideological preferences, with little in the way of empirical evidence to
back it up. As an argument, it seems based on the assumption that life
imitates (communitarian) theory, if it knows what's good for it.
If communitarian theory is warmed over adversarial technique-
aggressiveness with a post-modem face, so to speak-one reasonably might
wonder what the shouting is all about. Surely there must be something new
here, or we would not have had the furor of the last twenty years. There is
one way in which communitarian theory is different, though it may not help
much: It is much better at promoting itself than is adversarial theory.
Testimonials of communitarian scholars trumpet the contributions of the
theory to such things as deliberative democracy and personal
transformation 255 with an extravagance and sense of self-importance that
goes well beyond anything found in the literature on adversarial bargaining.
255 See, e.g., ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION
(Jeffery Z. Rubin, ed., 1994); Jeffrey R. Seul, How Transformative is Transformative
Mediation?: A Constructive-Developmental Assessment, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL.
135 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5
NEV. L.J. 347 (2005).
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In colloquial terms, communitarians talk a much better and bigger game. One
should be careful, however, around those who extol the purity of their
motives and the sophistication of their practices before either is called into
question. Such qualities, if real, usually do not need to be pointed out. Others
notice on their own. Rather than wait for that to happen, however,
communitarians have engaged in a kind of pre-emptive campaign to credit
the character of their method, using their own aesthetic preferences and
personal beliefs as evidence. This is another instance in which it would be
better to count all of the votes.
Given these difficulties, it is remarkable that so many legal academics
have accepted the argument for communitarian bargaining at face value.
Communitarians seemingly have been given a free pass on the issue of proof
at a time when the demand for empirical justification is greater than ever in
the academy. The legal professoriate must think nothing very important is
going on in the debate over bargaining theory, or they must have a very great
hatred for adversary methods generally, to be so quick to embrace the
communitarian alternative. On the other hand, communitarians may owe
their success more to their own tactical cleverness than to any particular
feature of the legal bargaining world. In a sense, they outflanked adversarial
bargainers by reconstituting the world in which bargaining operates in
exclusively communal terms. This, in turn, permitted them to redefine the
nature of bargaining effectiveness and make adversarial bargaining obsolete;
to supplant it without ever having proved it wrong. And they did all of this
principally by means of a virtuosic, rhetorical, meta move. In their own
terms, they "chang[ed] the game . .. [by] chang[ing] the frame." 256 Jim
White would be proud.257
III. CONCLUSION
If the twenty-five year debate between communitarian and adversarial
theories of bargaining effectiveness is a negotiation of sorts, it is hard to
resist the conclusion that communitarians are the better negotiators. They
have advanced their interests and defended their turf more aggressively and
successfully than their adversarial counterparts, and in the process even
taught the latter a thing or two about what it means to be adversarial. 258 The
256 See URY (rev. ed.), supra note 82, at 78-80.
257 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 27.
258 Communitarians prefer their aggression passive because that permits them to
deny it. Passive aggressive strategies can be as effective as overt ones, of course, but
because they are surreptitious they also are less respectful of others.
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irony in this will not surprise anyone familiar with the ways of the world.
Only a communitarian would be shocked to learn that he was as competitive
and self-interested as the next person when his own interests were at stake.
But it does raise an interesting question of whether the success of the
communitarian assault on bargaining theory should cause the legal profession
to rethink its understanding of effective bargaining. It is still, at least, an open
question whether communitarians have constructed a new, more communal
conception of the bargaining universe on which all can build, or instead have
simply created a new linguistic orthodoxy based on the re-labeling of
familiar bargaining technique in communitarian terms. Given the academic
hazards involved in trying to answer such a question, perhaps it would be
better to let go of the adversarial-communitarian dichotomy altogether. It is a
phony dichotomy after all. We are all both adversarial and communitarian as
our situations and interests dictate, and a complete theory of bargaining
effectiveness would draw extensively on both schools of thought. We need a
hybrid conception of bargaining, in other words, one that makes room for
both individualist and communal strategies and goals, if our bargaining
theory is to reflect all of the dimensions of our bargaining practice.259
Hybrids are not as attractive as pure types, of course, particularly in the
academy, but then beauty must make its peace with truth or neither will
survive. Glass slippers are pretty, but we learn in childhood that they also can
pinch, and that one size does not fit all.
259 Accord Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39, at 572-76 (describing new "hybrid"
processes "for human governance" that point "the way forward" to more effective dispute
settlement). Lax and Sebennius's "creating/claiming" conception is perhaps the most
sophisticated example of how the adversarial and communitarian aspects of bargaining
can be combined. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS
NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN (1986).
299
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
300
[Vol. 23:2 2008]
